

*Roberto Lagos Flores*

## Convergence between organized crime and insurgency in Chile

### Abstract

This study examines the convergence between organized crime and insurgency in Chile, a synergistic phenomenon of growing significance in the southern part of the country. Using a qualitative historical approach that combines specialized literature, official data, and case studies, it analyzes the dynamics of this convergence and its effects on the State and society. The findings indicate that, although insurgent and criminal groups pursue different objectives – some political and protest-driven, others profit-driven and economic – they have evolved by integrating tactics and establishing points of convergence that strengthen their operational capabilities and expand their reach. The article concludes that this convergence represents a hybrid threat to state stability and demands innovative institutional responses.

**Keywords:** organized crime, insurgency, terrorism

**Roberto Lagos Flores**, Political Scientist. Master's Degree in Sociology. Adjunct Professor, Universidad de las Américas, Chile. PhD from the University of the Basque Country, Spain.

**To cite this article:** Lagos, R. (2026), Convergence between organized crime and insurgency in Chile, *Revista Internacional de Estudios sobre Terrorismo*, issue 17:76-88.

**Received**  
04/02/2026

**Accepted**  
05/06/2026

## 1. Introduction

In recent years, Chile has experienced a relatively recent phenomenon in its national sociopolitical context: the connection between insurgency and organized crime. This article argues that this connection is characterized by the confluence of non-state actors that establish relations of cooperation, hybridization, or overlap, as they share resources, activities (essentially illicit), and, in certain cases, organizational structures. In Latin America, this occurs when cartels or gangs acquire military capabilities and local political functions. In Chile, although nuanced and ambivalent, this phenomenon is predominant in the southern macrozone (the regions of La Araucanía, Biobío, Los Ríos, and Los Lagos). There, radical politico-criminal organizations combine an ethnonationalist discourse with typical criminal actions such as drug trafficking, robberies, land seizures, and extortion.

Under this premise, this paper examines the characteristics, expressions, and consequences of this convergence, with the aim of assessing its impact on state management and national security. Methodologically, it employs a historical-qualitative study based on case studies and documentary analysis, using methods drawn from political science, criminology, and sociology. The sources include public documents, official reports, academic texts, and media testimonies (2021–2024). This material allows for the triangulation of information and the contrasting of narratives, with the purpose of prioritizing those events that simultaneously represent both insurgent and criminal dimensions. The objective is to identify common patterns that support the thesis of insurgent-criminal convergence, as well as its specific singularities that allow these actors to be defined as an internal hybrid threat, by combining criminal governance, illicit economies, irregular guerrilla tactics, and proto-terrorist activities. The study is geographically and historically limited to Chile, though it is not without repercussions for the Southern Cone due to its cross-border significance.

Analytically, the term insurgency refers to the politico-military movement that challenges state authority, which in turn resists it; irregular guerrilla warfare refers to the asymmetric combat tactics employed by said movement (Guindo, 2013); while the concept of terrorism constitutes one of the methods of action within that general and deliberate strategy:

“Criminal acts with political purposes conceived or planned to provoke a state of terror in the general population, in a group of persons, or in particular individuals are unjustifiable in all circumstances, whatever the political considerations” (United Nations General Assembly, 1994: para. 3, art. I).

These three concepts coexist in the phenomenon under study, but in a relationship of subordination: insurgency acts as the general framework, guerrilla warfare as the predominant method of these groups, and terrorism functions as the most extreme resource, though not for that reason irrelevant. The following five subchapters detail the magnitude of the phenomenon, the actors involved, the evidence supporting the thesis of convergence, a discussion on hybridity, and a concluding chapter on the implications of the problem.

## 2. Magnitude of the Phenomenon

Chile has recorded a significant growth in organized crime, evidenced by the increase in drug trafficking, smuggling, homicides, the presence of international criminal actors, and local gangs (GI-TOC, 2024). Lethal violence and criminality “would be linked to territorial disputes between criminal organizations. Undoubtedly, the growing use of firearms, associated with conflicts related to drug trafficking and territorial control, contributes to this increase” (Ministerio Público Chile, 2024: 7). Local gangs connect with transnational networks, learning from and generating dynamics of cooperation (and conflict), which has intensified violence and public sector corruption. Drug trafficking dominates as the illicit market, accompanied by arms trafficking and money laundering (GI-TOC, 2024). Although the country maintains certain institutional strength, its response capacity has been limited by problems of state coordination in the face of the new dynamics of crime and a growing perception of insecurity. In fact, this perception is reflected in comparative indicators: only 36% of Chileans reported feeling safe walking alone at night, one of the lowest rates worldwide (Gallup, 2024).

This diagnosis is further complicated by the terrorist dimension, particularly in the south of the country – a zone of enormous natural resources – where radicalized groups have generated a binomial between insurgency and organized crime. The Global Terrorism Index (2024) placed Chile among the countries with the greatest global impact on this issue, ranking it 17th worldwide. However, the recorded incidents were concentrated in internal territorial conflicts and targeted attacks in zones of ethnonationalist tension. Despite their low lethality, these internal security dynamics and related sociopolitical conflicts require greater attention from authorities in order to prevent escalation (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2024). Chile ranked second in the region behind Colombia, showing a worsening compared to 2012 and reaching its peak in 2022. It is also the worst-ranked country without a regular armed conflict, with a score of 5.679, and more than 78% of terrorist attacks were perpetrated by militants of Mapuche affiliation (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2024).

These organizations use illicit activities (illegal logging, land seizures, drug trafficking) to finance their “struggles” for territorial autonomy. Despite legislative updates, police efforts, and the continued declaration of “constitutional states of emergency” (regulated by the Constitution and Law No. 18.415), which incorporate military forces into internal security tasks, institutional weaknesses persist that facilitate the continuation of these terrorist actions and their coexistence with criminal acts.

Between 2015 and 2023, organized crime underwent a significant transformation (Ministerio Público Chile, 2024). Drug trafficking became consolidated as the main driver, generating high profits and driving associated crimes such as money laundering and homicides, while diversifying into synthetic drugs (MDMA, ketamine) and fentanyl, a substance present in the local illicit market. In

parallel, crimes against property (vehicle theft, timber theft, and copper theft) increased with greater operational sophistication, especially in the southern macrozone (Rodríguez Jiménez, 2024).

Reports of illegal logging grew from 2017 (201 reports) to 2020 (2.531 reports), an increase of over 200%. The damage to the industry reached US\$98 million in 2023, and over three years the total stolen amounted to 167 billion Chilean pesos (SOFOFA, 2024). This crime has fostered insurgent activity, being concentrated “in the southern macrozone of the country, specifically in sectors marked by territorial conflicts and high levels of violence (...) The groups dedicated to timber theft operate with a high degree of coordination” (Ministerio Público Chile, 2024: 12). In 2024 this crime stagnated due to stricter legislation and was replaced by salmon theft, concentrated in Biobío with 58% of the cases. The value of the stolen cargo exceeded US\$21 million, while theft from salmon farming centers was around US\$2 million, not counting unreported crimes (Avendaño, 2024). Available indications suggest that the same organized crime networks that operated in the illicit timber market redirected their activities toward salmon theft, replicating the *modus operandi* (hijacking the driver and appropriating the entire transport), which would reveal their tactical adaptability in the face of legislative changes<sup>1</sup>.

An indisputable phenomenon is the increase in violence originating from organized crime (GI-TOC, 2024). Territorial disputes between criminal organizations have increased homicides in major cities, urban centers, and in the far north and south: “organized crime in Chile has evolved significantly over the last decade, showing alarming diversification and sophistication” (Ministerio Público Chile, 2024: 6). According to Urquizar (2023: 29-39), regarding victims of violence in the southern macrozone, more than 7.000 violent incidents were recorded between 2014 and 2022, primarily arson, public disorder, and land seizures, with 1.861, 1.246, and 974 cases respectively.

### 3. Radical Actors

The magnitude described cannot be understood without identifying its main actors. At least eight insurgent groups in the southern macrozone are publicly identified as linked to organized crime – that is, as architects of this convergence. The Coordinadora Arauco Malleco (CAM), an old autonomist entity designated a “terrorist organization” by the State, exerts violence through its territorial resistance organs (ORT) to carry out sabotage and direct attacks; its leader was sentenced to 23 years in prison for serious crimes. It is considered the “mother” of all Chilean politico-military organizations (Urquizar, 2023: 59). The Comunidad Autónoma de Temucúicui (CAT) carries out land occupations (usurpations), and its main leader, awaiting formal charges for marijuana trafficking and illegal possession of weapons and ammunition. The Weichan Auka Mapu (WAM) is a particularly violent structure that forms alliances with the CAM, claims the territorial struggle, and has members

1

This type of theft is, for the time being, an activity carried out by mafias and gangs concentrated in the southern macrozone. Therefore, it is not possible to assert the involvement of radical Mapuche organizations in this offense, despite its nature as organized crime and the lucrative business it represents.

convicted of serious crimes such as the murder of an elderly couple. It is the organization that has perpetrated violent acts in the four regions of the macrozone and has claimed sabotage outside its area of influence (Ñuble and O'Higgins regions).

The Resistencia Mapuche Lavkenche (RML) and the Resistencia Mapuche Malleco (RMM) carry out numerous attacks and sabotage actions in Biobío and La Araucanía. The Wiñotauñ Taiñ Malon (WTM), presumably a splinter of the CAM, carries out attacks and sabotage against estates and forestry operations in Alto Biobío. The Lof en Resistencia Territorial Kütral Mahuidara (LRTKM) carries out attacks and controls rural and semi-rural roads and paths. The Movimiento Liberación Nacional Mapuche (LNM) is an emerging organization with high public impact that directly confronts state agents, claims "autonomy," and, given its radicalism, competes with the CAM for political-operational leadership, claiming incendiary attacks in La Araucanía and Biobío. It also maintains alliances for territorial recovery with organizations in Argentina (Díaz, 2022).

In addition to these visible actors, responsible for armed assaults, sabotage, incendiary attacks, train derailments, and land occupations, other organizations exist in a second link of the operational chain, such as Resistencia Mapuche Cautín, Resistencia Mapuche Pehuenche, Resistencia Kunko Williche, or Resistencia Mapuche Autónoma, among others. All have carried out violent acts and openly advocate armed struggle, although they can be classified as evolving belligerent bodies; at times they integrate into larger, consolidated entities, and at others they fragment or break away from them. Their dynamic resembles the operation of narco-cartels or South American insurgent groups, inserted in a pyramidal logic or detached from the main commands to carry out specific actions, confuse intelligence agencies, mutate into parallel businesses, provide support, or simply achieve spaces of independence. In some cases, they operate as secretive, hermetic guerrilla cells, arising from politico-social conjunctures and guided by two logics: insurgent armed struggle and assimilation with organized crime, necessary to plan, finance, and operationalize their theater of operations.

These groups operate independently or in conflict with other armed bodies, compete for markets and illicit resources, generating internal tensions, but they share a reivindicative discourse, similar political ends, and techniques of subversion and irregular guerrilla warfare. Not all organizations are robust and solid entities; many experience friction, periods of retreat and incubation, suffer police and prosecutorial persecution, withdraw in the face of military forces, and bear the tensions inherent to operating outside the law. They present differences in their politico-military behavior, internal dissidences, and disputes over survival strategies; yet they still coordinate from a geopolitical perspective, dividing up territories and markets. Their anchor remains La Araucanía and Biobío, with expansion into Los Ríos and Los Lagos, cohabiting in four vast regions with abundant natural resources and dominating the geography like no state agent, emulating narco-cartels and regional guerrillas.

A testimony following the destruction and burning of the historic Molino Grollmus in Contulmo, attributed to the Resistencia Mapuche Lafkenche, illustrates this convergence: “I am convinced that we are facing terrorist groups of a very professional level (...) this is not a Mapuche cause, it is the cause of narcoterrorists and organized criminal groups” (Carvajal, 2024: 28). This quote, with the limitations inherent to a subjective primary source, exposes three elements: avoiding the stigmatization of affected/victim communities and identifying the true perpetrators; the urgency of professionalizing law enforcement work to confront and adapt to these organizations; and reinforcing a counter-narrative that adopts an educational and public awareness perspective to curb recruitment by these groups and delegitimize their insurgent discourse.

#### 4. Empirical Evidence of Convergence

Between 2021 and 2024, insurgent-criminal activity escalated with attacks on critical infrastructure, heritage sites, symbolic locations, murders, and the consolidation of illicit economies that sustain these organizations. In 2022, just four days after the new administration of Gabriel Boric (2022–2026) took office, the entourage of the Minister of the Interior and Public Security was attacked in La Araucanía with shots fired into the air, road blockades, barricades, and intimidation messages. On her first visit to the region, as a representative of a political collective that, in contemporary political codes, was positioned in a zone of sympathy or support for the autonomy demands of these groups, she was met with a message written on a banner, similar to the “narco-banners” of drug cartels: “As long as there are political prisoners there will be no dialogue (...) we will not accept any bribe from a murderous State. No more militarization. Mapuche Resistance” (Del Pino, 2022: para. 7). The RMM group claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack and carried out other parallel actions such as the burning of churches, a community center, a school, and private vehicles (Poblete, 2022; Toro, 2023).

Following that show of force, more than 100 events associated with violence were recorded in April 2022 alone. This increase was not limited to insurgent-type violence; it also encompassed high-impact crimes typical of common delinquency, which rose 58% compared to 2021. In Ercilla, an armed group attacked truck drivers and left one driver seriously wounded by a gunshot to the face; in Lumaco, an attack by radical organizations against Mapuche forestry workers resulted in two wounded and one dead from a gunshot to the head (Stuardo, 2022). In 2023, high levels of violence were recorded with incendiary attacks, barricades, extortion of farmers, death threats against parliamentarians, burning of homes, attempted homicides, and arrests for timber theft (El Líbero, 2023).

Another case that reveals the terrorist character of these insurgent groups occurred in 2024 in the southern macrozone, a “red zone” of conflict, precisely in areas under the special regime of a state of exception that had the presence of the Armed Forces providing logistical and operational support to the Carabineros police. On April 27 of that year, on the institutional anniversary, three

police officers were ambushed, executed with shots to the head (kneeling and recorded on video), and their bodies burned along with the police vehicle. The incident occurred during a routine police check on a route known primarily for forestry activities and whose traffic is limited due to its danger. Prior violence on that route includes ambushes on journalists and attacks on civilian vehicles mistaken for forestry transports. A case prior to the murder of the three Carabineros occurred in January of the same year, when unknown individuals fired on police personnel and threw explosives (Cruzat, 2024; De la Fuente, 2024).

Beyond these emblematic events, crimes such as murders, burning of estates, extortion, drug trafficking, territorial control actions, and systematic attacks on symbolic entities of the state (churches, parishes, temples, cemeteries, schools, kindergartens, municipalities) persist, along with large-scale forest fires in these four regions of the country. These attacks appear linked to terrorist motivations because they occur in the same communes that concentrate the highest rates of intentional fires, coinciding with sectors of greater insurgent activity (Plaza, 2025).

On this basis, it can be stated that social destabilization and the intensification of violence continue to escalate, revealing the State's inability to contain this violence of dual nature – criminal and seditious – even under “constitutional exception” rules and with the presence of the Armed Forces. This calls into question the effectiveness of governmental strategies and the institutional capacity to provide comprehensive responses; additionally, it highlights the need to focus symbolic messages, state intelligence and counterintelligence efforts, and the tactics of these groups. The historical evolution of insurgent groups provides valuable comparative background for anticipating possible trajectories. In this sense, Torres Preciado (2024:19) illustrates this dynamic: “In 1966 the FARC had 6 fronts and about 300 men (...) In 1991 the balance showed sustained growth, with 48 fronts comprising 5.800 guerrillas”. This author also noted that in 2002 the FARC consisted of more than 20.000 men and a single bloc (the eastern one) came to control 55% of Colombian territory.

From this case, the historical fact of overwhelming growth of an insurgent group and its impact on national security can be drawn, focused not only on the increase in the number of combatants and fronts, but on the advance of an offensive posture that expanded territorial control and challenged the State more effectively. In Chile, significant parallels emerge with the FARC case, without ignoring the structural differences between the Colombian and Chilean contexts. Chilean insurgent groups, which learned from and formally related to Colombian guerrilla leaders, demonstrate operational capabilities and consolidated strategies for carrying out coordinated attacks, ambushes, and operating in territories they know exhaustively (Aburto, 2015; Policía Nacional de Colombia, 2020; Porto, 2021). It could be argued that, despite lacking their magnitude and strategic achievements, some indications of significance are observed: growth in their force capabilities (organization and coordination of attacks), the consolidation of areas of influence, and the development of propaganda (publication of books and testimonies in sympathetic media); thus accentuating their territorial control and the State's inability to guarantee full security in these regions. Their offensive strategies, without reaching

direct combat against the military, employ maneuvers that fulfill their tactical objectives: obtaining resources, repelling police forces, interrupting routes, and challenging the State, as evidenced by the murders of police officers and unusual terrorist attacks (Zamorano and Navarrete, 2023; Strigunov, 2025).

This Chilean phenomenon could be classified as an internal, irregular armed conflict, territorially limited at the national level – although extensive in the number of communes and provinces – of low to medium intensity, with tactics typical of insurgent guerrilla warfare and the use of weapons and military elements that, for now, prevent direct confrontation with the military (Toro, 2022). From this derives the possibility of designating them as dual-faced groups: insurgent and organized crime associations that employ terrorism and criminality for their political ends, but without full consolidation.

Thus, the intersection between insurgent action, terrorist practices, and organized crime is evident, confirming the role of large-scale timber theft as a profitable activity in the conflict zone, carried out by these same structures or their occasional associates. In timber theft, operational sophistication was observed through the creation of front companies, control of the production chain (theft, transport, and sale in licit markets), and the systematic use of violence, with intimidating methods, threats, or direct attacks carried out by self-proclaimed reivindicative groups, although their main practical aim was profit. In fact, they seize estates to illegally harvest forests. This enrichment occurs in zones presented as a historical aspiration, but which conceal the need for illicit revenue (Ministerio Público Chile, 2024). The 2022 legislative reform classified this timber theft offense, included money laundering, and allowed for their prosecution, achieving an 82% reduction (Ministerio Público Chile, 2024). According to Rodríguez Jiménez (2024:21): “this phenomenon, beyond the political and armed cause, is also associated with Organized Crime, that is, through the theft of timber from private companies and its subsequent illicit sale, in order to finance that armed struggle”.

Another demonstrative fact in this connection is the indiscriminate use of violence to perpetrate various types of robberies with intimidation and to carry out terrorist attacks. This convergence has violent but lucrative manifestations: incendiary attacks and road blockades allow for the execution of robberies of various kinds and the clearing of roads for their exclusive use in drug transport and contraband merchandise; actions that, presented as reivindicative acts, conceal criminal maneuvers (Ministerio Público Chile, 2024).

## 5. Insurgent-Criminal Hybridity

The concept of insurgency in Latin America has evolved from rural and peasant rebellions toward a more complex phenomenon that combines traditional actions, modern revolutionary ideologies, and new guerrilla warfare tactics (Desai & Eckstein, 1990). This phenomenon can be

confused with other forms of political violence; therefore, a clearer theoretical framework is needed for its proper identification. According to Guindo (2013:213), insurgencies “employ guerrilla and terrorism tactics, espouse revolutionary causes, adopt an asymmetric approach to conflict, operate on the moral and legal margins of society, and make no distinction (or at least it is barely perceptible) between combatants and civilians”.

Some theorists have argued that in the twenty-first century the American subcontinent has witnessed a renaissance of insurgency, this time coupled with other contemporary, volatile, and versatile phenomena; hence one could properly speak of new insurgencies (Guindo, 2013). The Chilean case presented here would be an example of this, and evidence that this ambivalence is capable of having regional repercussions. In particular, the convergence of insurgent-criminal activity shows that the networks or tentacles of criminal organizations link up and optimize with their primary political objectives, perfecting their operations and assuming a political direction planned in advance by these collectives. As Cassaglia indicates: “although organized crime and terrorism have different objectives – in the case of the former it is the acquisition of money and with it the purchase of wills through corruption; in the case of the latter, their ultimate objective is political (...) they mix to optimize their actions” (2022:32).

The literature has shown that it is common for organized crime groups to relate pragmatically or even ideologically, in concert, with political positions in situations of internal conflict. De la Corte and Giménez-Salinas (2023) examine this convergence, accepting that it constitutes a habitual practice, exemplified by the recurrence of crimes such as vehicle theft, weapons theft, and any other material with the aim of committing insurgent-type attacks, with which they cover the costs of their seditious activity. This explains, in Chile, large-scale timber theft, forced land occupations, and extortion of farmers, which allow these entities to finance their activity and establish links with groups in Argentina, transforming this problem into an international issue.

There are numerous international examples of this link. FARC dissidents became a diaspora of drug trafficking networks and human trafficking agents, while in Peru's VRAEM, insurgent groups – remnants of Sendero Luminoso – operate in the main coca leaf and cocaine producing region. This demonstrates that, along with the sphere of political violence, they engage in practices typical of criminality. A similar phenomenon occurs in Chile's southern macrozone, with similar groups that: espouse an essentially insurgent discourse (of land recovery), based on historical reivindicative demands typical of separatist groups (a singular narrative of land, culture, and symbols); are of violent radicalism and appropriate local and peasant communities; maintain the autonomist conflict with the State (its institutions and laws); carry out guerrilla maneuvers and establish illicit economies (marijuana production and distribution, timber theft, extortion of farmers, and land seizures). Analogous practices have occurred in Colombia and Peru with similar organizations. What these

cases teach Chile is that early inaction and indecision by authorities transform low-intensity actors into regional-scale threats.

In classificatory terms, the various armed groups in southern Chile, as described above, largely fulfill the five pillars expressed by Jordán (2008) to classify them as new insurgencies: 1) they engage in armed struggle, 2) they develop propaganda, 3) they provide social assistance, 4) they practice social and political activism; and 5) they have guarantees of receiving support from abroad, that is, they engage in practice in international relations outside the national State. Indeed, in the Chilean case, armed violence coexists with identitarian propaganda, cross-border coordination, and support from local communities, configuring a mixture that transcended ethnic protest to become a politico-criminal actor.

This insurgent-criminal convergence constitutes what the specialized literature calls a hybrid threat: the synergistic combination of actors with a political agenda and organized crime practices that operate simultaneously as a seditious threat and a criminal threat (Bartolomé, 2019). This dual nature articulates strategies of criminal governance with irregular guerrilla tactics. Its protagonists practice criminal methodologies, but their main driver is a political agenda and its systematic regime of intimidation toward the population with the purpose of generating changes in their favor (in policies or laws), undermining the legitimacy of the political order, and mobilizing sympathizers toward their causes.

A clear example of this hybridity is the difficulty in obtaining exemplary and firm convictions against their members and capturing fugitive leaders, a habitual fact in insurgent and irregular struggles, characterized by asymmetry, concealment, and ambiguity. These maneuvers generate confusion and limit the effectiveness of the State's response policies and measures. Furthermore, their hybridity is evident in their political achievements, since certain Chilean elites with high social, cultural, political, and economic capital have provided them with continuous support (tacit or explicit), maintaining ambivalent positions, which has hindered their effective neutralization. This ambivalence manifested with high notoriety during the 2023 constituent process, when proposals for politico-territorial autonomy were debated that, from a security perspective, were interpreted as a possible avenue for the partial legitimization of these actors' demands. The underlying structural tension was not eliminated by the majority rejection of the constitutional proposal. In this case, the notion of hybrid threat does not designate only the coexistence of insurgency and criminality, but the strategic integration of both planes (Bartolomé, 2019).

## 6. Conclusions

The documented terrorist acts reveal enduring, adaptive, versatile, and economically sustainable active capabilities that have caused systemic consequences: 1) Chile is among the countries with the highest levels of fear worldwide; 2) the persistence of certain political elites that sympathize with or

justify the insurgency; 3) a deterioration of state capacities to confront these events, to the point of the existence of “shared sovereignty” with them in focalized zones; and 4) contagion to other social environments, as new forms of violence and criminality have transferred to urban and metropolitan contexts. Despite the capture of some of their members, the lack of cohesion among these collectives, and their domestic dissidences, their presence, economic capacity, and mobility have not diminished. They are proactive in concealment maneuvers and in variations of their *modus operandi*.

The persistence of a mobilizing ethnonationalist narrative, despite the predominance of its lucrative motivations, also introduces a possible analytical paradox that needs to be investigated in future studies. In the face of this persistence, three lines of institutional response arise: at the legislative level, to consolidate the classification of crimes linked to insurgent economies; in intelligence work, to develop analytical capabilities that differentiate and act on the political and criminal dimensions of the case; and at the educational-communicational level, to develop broad counter-narratives that delegitimize the insurgent discourse without stigmatizing affected communities. Progress on these points intensifies the debate regarding governmental technologies and devices to confront the phenomenon; however, limitations persist, as does the lack of decision or negligence on the part of authorities, very evident in the continuity of constitutional states of exception without conclusive results against proto-terrorist acts.

In short, the intersection between insurgency and organized crime in Chile reveals a multifaceted phenomenon that demands more rigorous, dispassionate attention and constant reflection. The combination of traditional and novel guerrilla tactics with classic criminal practices generates a context of hybridity and persistent violence that challenges the State’s ability to guarantee security and public order, as well as the authorities’ decision-making to act accordingly.

## 7. Referencias

- Aburto, N. (2015, July 31, 2015). *Los estrechos lazos entre las FARC y el PC chileno que fueron plasmados en casi 300 correos*. Biobío Chile.
- Avendaño, E. (2024, December 25, 2024). *El lucrativo giro de las mafias de la macrozona sur: de robo de madera a robo de salmón*. El Líbero.
- Bartolomé, M. (2019). *Amenazas y conflictos híbridos: características distintivas, evolución en el tiempo y manifestaciones preponderantes*. URVIO, Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad, 25, 8-23.
- Carvajal, V. (December 21, 2024). *El resultado de la Comisión para la Paz no va a detener la violencia en la Macrozona Sur*. La Tercera.

- Cassaglia, A. (2022). *Los tentáculos entrelazados del crimen organizado y el terrorismo*. Revista AL-GHURABÁ, 58, 30-40.
- Cruzat, L. (2024, April 27, 2024). *Les robaron las armas y camioneta tenía cuatro disparos: OS9 y Labocar indagan triple crimen de carabineros en Cañete*. EMOL.
- De la Corte, L., y Giménez-Salinas, A. (2023). *Crimen.org. Evolución y claves de la delincuencia organizada*. Ariel.
- De la Fuente, A. (2024, April 30, 2024). *Atentados y violencia: así es la peligrosa carretera P-72, donde fueron asesinados tres carabineros en Chile*. El País.
- Del Pino, J. M. (2022). *Primer revés para Boric en Chile: atacaron la comitiva de la ministra del Interior durante una visita a una región mapuche*. CLARÍN.
- Desai, R., & Eckstein, H. (1990). *Insurgency: The transformation of peasant rebellion*. World Politics, 42(4), 441-465.
- Díaz, W. (May 5, 2022). *Cómo operan los 7 grupos violentistas mapuches de la Macrozona Sur, sus líderes y zonas de influencia*. Ex-Ante.
- El Líbero. (March 20, 2023). *Indicador de Violencia en la Macrozona Sur registra la semana más violenta del año*. El Líbero.
- Gallup. (2024). *Gallup Global Emotions 2024*. The Gallup Organization.
- GI-TOC. (2024). *Global Organized Crime Index 2024*. Ginebra.
- Guindo, M. G. (2013). *El concepto de insurgencia a debate: una aproximación teórica*. Revista de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociológicas, 12, 211-224.
- Institute for Economics & Peace. (2024). *Global Terrorism Index 2024: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism*. Sydney.
- Jordán, J. (2008). *Las nuevas insurgencias. Análisis de un fenómeno estratégico emergente*. Anuario Español de Derecho Internacional, 24, 271-298.
- Ministerio Público Chile. (2024). *Crimen Organizado en Chile: Informe*. Unidad Especializada en Crimen Organizado y Drogas.
- Plaza, P. (January 12, 2025). *Corma en alerta por 8 nuevos incendios intencionales en Los Álamos: exigen fiscal con dedicación exclusiva*. Radio Agricultura.
- Poblete, J. (August 1, 2022). *La alianza estratégica de 3 grupos radicales detrás de la última ola de violencia en la Macrozona Sur*. Ex-Ante.

Policía Nacional de Colombia. (2020). *Policía, terrorismo e inseguridad*. Imprenta Nacional de Colombia.

Porto, J. (November 1, 2021). *El terrorismo mapuche y su relación con la guerrilla colombiana*. Pucará Defensa.

Rodríguez Jiménez, C. (2024). *Tráfico ilícito de madera en la macrozona sur de Chile: análisis de la fenomenología y sus actores criminales*. Cuadernos de Criminología (Segunda época), 1(1), 18-26.

SOFOFA. (2024). *Propuestas de SOFOFA al combate del crimen organizado*.

Strigunov, K. (2025). *Militarization of Criminal Organizations as a Factor of Criminal Insurgency: The Case of Latin American Gangs and Cartels*. *Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law*. 18(1).

Stuardo, M. (May 24, 2022). *Muere trabajador mapuche baleado en su cabeza durante ataque armado en Lumaco*. Biobío Chile.

Toro, D. (August 4, 2023). *Resistencia Mapuche Malleco (RMM): El perfil de la organización detrás del ataque en Traiguén y casi 30 en lo que va del año*. EMOL.

Toro, J. (2022). *Violencia en la macrozona sur. Una mirada desde los estudios de conflictos internos*. Documento de Trabajo N° 14, AthenaLab.

Torres Preciado, J. F. (2024). *Seguridad interna y contrainsurgencias en Colombia, Perú y El Salvador*. *Revista de Pensamiento Estratégico y Seguridad CISDE*, 9(2), 11-25.

United Nations General Assembly. (1994). *Resolution 49/60: Measures to eliminate international terrorism*.

Urquizar, P. (2023). *Radiografía de la violencia y el terrorismo en la Macrozona Sur: problemas y desafíos actuales*. Editorial San Sebastián.

Zamorano, C., y Navarrete, J. (September 21, 2023). *Detienen a once sujetos vinculados a Resistencia Mapuche Lavkenche: un carabinero activo entre ellos*. La Tercera.