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Editorial

17 August marked the fifth anniversary of the attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils in which sixteen people were killed. In everyone's mind are those horrifying images broadcast for the first time during the trial, and which were widely disseminated by the media, in which surveillance cameras placed along the iconic street of Las Ramblas in Barcelona show how the van driven by the terrorist Youness Abouyaqoub runs over 500 metres into the people who were walking there, leaving hundreds injured and fourteen dead, including two children.

The laborious and exhaustive post-attack investigation carried out by the various security forces has revealed everything from how and when the members of the well-known Ripoll cell began their radicalisation to a large part of the movements they made while planning attacks whose original plan involved the preparation and manufacture of at least 200 kilos of TATP explosive.

Five years after the attacks, and despite the different investigations carried out both nationally and internationally, no direct link has been found that would allow us to conclude that these attacks had the involvement of Daesh, beyond the ideological inspiration under which the Ripoll cell acted. As has occurred with the vast majority of attacks in Europe in recent years, the perpetrators of these terrorist actions took the step towards committing attacks in many cases after entering a process of radicalisation marked by the ideological influence of Daesh, but without ever receiving instructions, logistical support or funding from the terrorist organisation. However, the attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils have a double singularity, as since those fateful days in August there has not been another attack in Europe committed by a terrorist cell, but rather by individual actors. Fortunately, there have also been no terrorist attacks of greater lethality than this one since then.

Focusing on the content that the reader will find in issue 6 of the International Journal of Terrorism Studies, in terms of purely academic research there are four papers on a wide range of topics. The first of these is by Chilean researcher Mauricio Heise, who takes a conceptual approach to the meaning of the term terrorism and the instrumentalisation of its practice by terrorist organisations. This work is followed by that of Gaizka Fernández, head of the archive and research area of the Memorial Centre for Victims of Terrorism, on the controversial and uncomfortable figure of the victimiser who also ends up being a victim of terrorism. The third research comes from Italy and is authored by Christian Tratz, who in his meticulous work tackles the origins of al-Qaeda through the network previously created by the Maktab al-Khidamāt. Finally, and as a

signature of the Young Researchers Network, the reader will find the article written by Enrique Herrero, who takes stock of the evolution of terrorism in the Philippines and analyses the context of the current threat posed by Jihadism.

In this issue 6 we publish two reviews. The first is by Professor Yolanda Alonso, who analyses the work entitled “Mujeres víctimas del terrorismo y mujeres contra el terrorismo. Historia, memoria, labor y legado”, a work published in March 2022 and coordinated by Laura González Piote, Alfredo Crespo Alcázar and José Luis Rodríguez Jiménez. The second was written by Teresa Sánchez in relation to the work “Balas para todas” (Bullets for all), coordinated by journalist Natalia Sancha.

The two reviews are followed by the other sections of a more informative nature, which aim to make knowledge of terrorism studies accessible to the general public. In the “History of Terrorism” section, there are three sections: on the one hand, the file on the terrorist organisation studied in this case, JNIM, a Jihadist group with a high level of activity in the Western Sahel region and which is under the umbrella of Al Qaeda. On the other hand, this month’s event focuses on the lethal 1983 Beirut bombing claimed by Islamic Jihad. The last section of this section is ‘Events’, which covers the most important events of the last four months, including the death of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri during an anti-terrorist operation in Kabul carried out by a US drone at the end of July.

In the “Did you know?” section, special attention is given to terrorism studies from a shorter, more concise perspective, presenting five interesting aspects of terrorism that are often little known to the general public. Without going any further, this issue seeks to dispel the myth that terrorists are poorly trained or that terrorist organisations have a low success rate. All of this is based on empirical evidence and factual facts that follow academic rigour.

Finally, “Memory of the victims” remembers the sixteen people who were killed in the attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils in 2017. As it could not be otherwise, we also want this last section to serve as a tribute and remembrance to all the surviving victims and their families whose lives have been forever marked by those attacks. Even so, their ability to overcome is an example of daily learning for the whole of society.

Having presented issue 6 of RIET, we invite the reader to immerse themselves carefully in all the proposed content and to enjoy learning with it.

Gaizka Fernández Soldevilla

Pieces that don't fit together? The awkward figure of perpetrator-victim in the narrative of terrorism

Abstract

We consider perpetrator-victims to be those persons who first violated the fundamental human rights of other individuals through the use of illegitimate violence and then suffered illegitimate violence themselves, resulting in their death. This is a complicated and controversial figure, more so in the context of the recent history of terrorism in Spain. The aim of this article is to distinguish and examine the different typologies of perpetrator-victims through illustrative examples of each of them. After analyzing such cases, we will try to answer two essential questions. On the one hand, how to fit the perpetrator-victimizer into a rigorously elaborated historical account of terrorism? On the other hand, what memory policy should be followed with this figure?

Keywords: Perpetrator-victim, victim, terrorism, Francoism, political violence

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1. Introduction¹

On 2 March 2022, the gymnasium of the Arles prison in France was the scene of a brutal attack. Franck Elong Abé, a Cameroonian serving a sentence for jihadism, beat up another inmate, Corsican Yvan Colonna, who was badly injured. The assailant claimed that his victim had blasphemed against Mohammed. As a result of his serious injuries, Colonna died on 21 March. The crime caused Corsica to be shaken by mass protests organised by the nationalist movement, which blamed Colonna's death on the French authorities. In Spain, certain media adopted such a discourse, presenting the deceased as a "pro-independence prisoner" and/or "political prisoner" (Naiz, 2022). However, Colonna had not been imprisoned for his nationalist ideology, but for a crime of bloodshed: in February 1998 he had shot dead the prefect of Corsica, Claude Érignac.

In Yvan Colonna, two apparently contradictory facets coincided: that of a terrorist and that of a victim of a terrorist. His case fits into the category of perpetrator-victims: those who first violated the fundamental human rights of other individuals through the use of unlawful violence (whether as perpetrators or masterminds) and then suffered unlawful violence themselves, resulting in their death². This is not an anomaly. Anyone who dives into contemporary history will find more or less similar examples. While any form of political violence generates its own perpetrator-victims, perhaps the area in which they are most clearly distinguished is that of terrorism. Between 1971 and 1972 the Japanese Unified Red Army, an extreme left-wing group, killed almost half of its own members (fourteen out of thirty) as unworthy subjects. In Northern Ireland, republican and loyalist terrorists killed each other and sometimes, when accused of treason, members of their own gangs. Something similar happened in the settling of scores between the various violent groups operating in Palestine, although the level of lethality of the current global 'civil war' between Al Qaeda and Daesh franchises has probably never been reached (González Calleja, 2013, Keefe, 2020, and Avilés, Azcona and Re, 2019)³.

Terrorists are not only victims of other terrorists. They can also be victims of police abuses (such as torture, for example) or illegitimate institutional violence. After the kidnapping and murder of eleven Israeli athletes and coaches during the 1972 Munich Olympics, the Mossad hunted down and killed the alleged perpetrators of the massacre, which had been claimed by Black September (Igualada, 2021: 57-65). This is just one example of the Israeli government's counter-terrorism operations that have gone beyond international legality, although it is not the only state entity to do so.

Although there are hardly any academic works on the subject, with the exception of Galo Bilbao (2009) in his pioneering work *Jano en medio del terror* (Janus in the midst of terror), victim-victims related to terrorism have also been present in Spain's recent history. However, it is a figure that is so uncomfortable that, with some exceptions, it has either been overlooked or has been the subject of a treatment that has resulted in

1 The author would like to thank Raúl López Romo, Martín Alonso, Galo Bilbao, Jesús Casquete and José Luis de la Granja for their helpful suggestions, corrections and contributions. This article has been carried out in the framework of the research programme of the Centro Memorial de las Víctimas del Terrorismo, of the GIR Humanities and Social Sciences in the Digital and Technological Era of the University Isabel I and of the research project of the University of the Basque Country PGC2018-094133-B-I00 (MCIU/AEI/FEDER, EU).

2 For further definitions of the terms "victim" and "perpetrator", see: <https://glosariotv.com/>

3 On the dramatic consequences of jihadist violence in recent years, see the yearbooks published by the International Observatory for Terrorist Studies, all of which are available at: <https://observatoriotorismo.com/anuarios-del-terrorismo-yihadista/>

bitter controversies that have reached the present day. On the one hand, legislation has been passed at national level that allowed certain types of institutional tributes to be paid to Francoist perpetrators-victims of terrorism such as Melitón Manzanás, who was awarded the Royal Order of Civil Recognition to Victims of Terrorism posthumously in application of Law 32/1999. On the other hand, radical Basque nationalism has instrumentalised Manzanás himself and Luis Carrero Blanco to tarnish the image of the collective of victims of terrorism while glorifying (and continues to glorify⁴) the terrorist perpetrators of Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) “fallen” in one way or another considered *gudaris* (warriors) martyrs (Casquete, 2009).

Although each perpetrator-victim has a different individual story, we can classify them into various typologies. In the first part of this article, without any intention of being exhaustive, illustrative examples of each of them will be presented as a taster. The analysis of the different cases will help us to establish some characteristics and problems common to the whole group.

In the second and final part of the work we will try to answer two essential analytical-reflexive questions. One is on how to fit the perpetrator-victim into a rigorous historical narrative⁵ and the other is on what memory policy should public institutions follow with such a thorny figure.

2. Perpetrator-victims in the context of terrorism in Spain

Perpetrators of the Franco regime-victims of terrorism

The first group of perpetrator-victims is made up of civil servants who held positions of high responsibility during the dictatorship and who were assassinated by a terrorist gang. Although they are not the only ones, there are two who stand out above the rest: Manzanás and Carrero Blanco.

Melitón Manzanás, head of the Social Investigation Brigade in San Sebastián, had a well-deserved reputation as a torturer. This was precisely what led the ETA leadership to choose him as the first target for a deadly attack, along with his Bilbao counterpart, José María Junquera. However, on 7 June 1968, Txabi Echebarrieta got ahead of the organisation's plans by assassinating 25-year-old Galician civil guard José Antonio Pardines. Finally, after reactivating Operation Sagarra, on 2 August 1968 a gunman assassinated Manzanás in his house in Irún. The attack was welcomed by an important sector of anti-Francoism, especially when it became clear that, as ETA had predicted, the regime reacted with clumsy, ferocious and often indiscriminate repression (Fernández and Domínguez, 2018).

The other Francoist perpetrator-victim of terrorism was Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, a key player in maintaining Franco's anti-democratic system: he was the dictator's right-hand man and had a long career, first in the military and then in politics, culminating in the vice-presidency (1967-1973) and the presidency of the Government (1973). On 20 December 1973, a bomb exploded under Carrero Blanco's official vehicle, killing him, his driver, José Luis Pérez Moga, and one of his bodyguards, police inspector Juan Antonio Bueno

4 See data from Covite's Radicalisation Observatory at <https://covite.org/observatorio/>

5 On the term “story” see <https://glosariovt.com/glosario-vt/relato/>

Fernández. The attack also wounded seven people, two of them children. The death of Carrero Blanco was celebrated by a sector of the Spanish public and further increased the popularity that ETA had gained during the Burgos trial, which meant that some anti-Franco political parties took some time to openly take a stand against terrorist violence (Tusell, 1993, and Fernández and García, 2022).

2.1. *Perpetrators of terrorism-victims of the dictatorship*

The second class of perpetrator-victims that we identify are the terrorists who, during Franco's regime, were sentenced to death by courts martial, which did not usually comply with the minimum legal guarantees (Fernández and Briones, 2020). Despite the mobilisations to save their lives that were called throughout and outside Spain, four of them were executed during the last years of the regime. We are not referring here to the activist of the *Directorio Revolucionario Ibérico de Liberación* (Antonio Abad Donoso) nor to the two members of the anarchist *Defensa Interior* (Joaquín Delgado and Francisco Granado) executed in the early 1960s, since they had no homicides behind them, but to those who were sentenced for alleged blood crimes during the convulsive late Francoist period (Fernández, 2021).

On 2 March 1974 Salvador Puig Antich, a former member of the Iberian Liberation Movement (MIL), was arrested in Barcelona after being convicted of the murder of sub-inspector Francisco Anguas Barragán in September of the previous year. On 27 September 1975, three members of the *Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriota* (FRAP) were shot in Hoyo de Manzanares: José Humberto Baena (sentenced to death for the murder of policeman Lucio Rodríguez Martín), José Luis Sánchez Bravo and Ramón García Sanz (convicted of the murder of Guardia Civil lieutenant Antonio Pose Rodríguez). At the same time, members of ETA politico-military (ETApm) Ángel Otaegi (convicted of the murder of sergeant in the Civil Guard Gregorio Posadas Zurrón) and Juan Paredes Manot (Txiki) (convicted of the murder of sergeant in the Armed Police Ovidio Díaz López) were executed. All of them were members of terrorist gangs, but there was only solid evidence that some of them were guilty of the blood crimes for which they had been sentenced. Moreover, Franco's military justice system lacked legitimacy and the minimum guarantees (Casanellas, 2014, and Fernández, 2019 and 2021).

2.2. *Perpetrators of terrorism-victims of illegitimate police violence*

Inflicting pain on suspects arrested to obtain information or a confession was a common police practice during Franco's regime, but it did not suddenly disappear on 20 November 1975. Like other inertia inherited from the dictatorship, it was difficult for the rule of law to put an end to this phenomenon. Thus, during the Transition (and beyond), an indeterminate number of detained terrorists were subjected to brutality and ill-treatment by certain agents of the State Security Forces and Corps (FCSE) (Casanellas, 2014, Baby, 2018, and Ballester, 2022).

One of the most tragic cases was that of ETA military member (ETAm) Joseba Arregi Izagirre, who died in February 1981 as a result of the torture to which he had been subjected by some police officers in the General Directorate of Security in Madrid (El País, 1981). He is therefore a terrorist perpetrator-victim of illegitimate police violence.

2.3. *Perpetrators of terrorism-victims of vigilante terrorism*

Vigilante terrorism⁶ sought to wrest the monopoly of force from the state and substitute the security forces in the fight against terrorism, bypassing legal channels, which it believed were too limited for effective policing. Moreover, vigilante violence on French soil sought to deprive ETA of its “sanctuary”.

From 1975 until the consolidation of democracy, camouflaging itself with acronyms of convenience (such as the Triple A or the Basque-Spanish Battalion, BVE), vigilante terrorism caused between 25 and 30 deaths. And from 1983 to 1987, attacks by the Anti-Terrorist Liberation Groups (GAL), the quintessential expression of vigilante terrorism in Spain, took the lives of 27 people, to which should be added another two deaths in 1989, when these acronyms had already disappeared (López Romo, 2015).

Although its aim was to fight terrorists with their own weapons, vigilante terrorism killed, by mistake or for other reasons, many citizens who were not members of clandestine organisations. Thus, for example, Raúl López Romo (2015) has calculated that 11 of the 27 fatalities of the GAL (40% of the total) did not belong to ETA. Among these 11 fatalities are some members of the political wing of the terrorist group⁷.

In other cases, the victims of vigilante terrorism were terrorists. In December 1978, a pipe bomb killed José Miguel Beñaran (Argala), the undisputed leader of military ETA, and therefore ultimately responsible for the crimes that this organisation had committed since its birth at the end of 1974. Someone claimed responsibility for the crime in the name of the BVE (Casals, 2020), although it seems that the perpetrators were certain military personnel who had decided to avenge the death of Carrero Blanco, since Argala had been one of the material authors of the assassination (Rubio, 2003). The BVE acronym was used again in June 1979 after the assassination in Paris of two members of the *Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre* (GRAPO), Francisco Javier Martín and Aurelio Fernández (Castro, 2000).

The first fatal victims of the GAL, a plot in which the leadership of the Ministry of the Interior was involved, were ETA members José Antonio Lasa and José Ignacio Zabala, who were kidnapped, tortured, murdered, and buried in October 1983 (López Romo, 2015). Subsequently, more members of the gang were subjected to vigilante attacks. In December 1983, GAL terrorists killed Juan Ramón Oñederra (*Kattu*) in Bayonne and wounded ETA leader Miguel Goicoechea (*Txapela*), who died the following month. In February 1984 vigilante terrorism caused more casualties for ETA. First, Bixente Perurena and Ángel Gurmindio. On

6 For more information on this term, see: <https://glosariovt.com/glosario-vt/terrorismo-parapolicial/>

7 Unless a rigorous investigation has been carried out to prove their status as collaborators with the terrorists, we do not include in the category of perpetrator-victims the victims of vigilante terrorism who were members of the political wing of the GRAPO, such as the PCE (r), or of ETA, such as Herri Batasuna (HB).

the 25th of the same month, Eugenio Gutiérrez Salazar (*Tiger*) was killed by a sniper.

2.4 Perpetrators of terrorism-victims of their own terrorism

Ferdinand Lassalle wrote to Karl Marx: ‘Internal struggle gives the party strength and vitality; the greatest proof of a party’s weakness is amorphousness and the absence of clear-cut boundaries; the party strengthens itself by purging itself’ (Lenin, 2010). Although without reaching the suicidal level of the Unified Red Army, to which reference has already been made in the introduction, ETA has also purged some of its aspirants, members, and former members.

In November 1978, the gang assassinated former ETA member Joaquín Azaola Martínez (*Jokin*), who four years earlier had foiled a plan to kidnap the then Prince Juan Carlos de Borbón and his family on the Côte d’Azur. The subsequent communiqué made clear the exemplary purpose of that reprisal: “Let us hope that the execution of Jokin will serve as an example and a warning to those who are tempted to follow his path in the belief that ETA has no means of doing justice” (De Otálora, 2018) .

In June 1980, three months after his release from prison, a gunman shot former ETA member Tomás Sulibarria Goitia (*Tomi*) in the back of the head. The organisation accused him of having been an “infiltrator” (Alonso, Domínguez and García, 2010, and Fernández Soldevilla, 2016).

From the perspective of the self-styled “*izquierda abertzale*”, there were many forms of treason. José Luis Oliva Hernández was one of the members of ETA’s *Orbaiceta* commando, which had successfully robbed a bank. His comrades considered him guilty of having spent part of the loot on drugs. He was sentenced to death, a sentence carried out by the terrorists in January 1981. However, as at that time the gang was promoting a campaign of assassinations of alleged drug traffickers, they preferred not to risk their image and claimed that Oliva had been “executed for infiltration” (Alonso, Domínguez and García, 2010, and García, 2020).

Two are the best-known cases of ETA military ETA perpetrator-victims. Mikel Solaun was a former ETA member who had returned to Spain after the 1977 amnesty. Seven years later, in February 1984, when he had rebuilt his life, he was murdered for avoiding a massacre: he had indicated to the Guardia Civil the location of a bomb that the gang had forced him to hide in a barracks that his company had built and which was about to be inaugurated (Alonso, Domínguez and García, 2010, and Zuzen, no. 41, 01/1985).

Dolores González Katarain (*Yoyes*) was Argala’s right-hand woman and the first woman to reach a position in the leadership of ETAm, an organisation whose internal functioning was male-dominated (Fernández Soldevilla, 2021). After the assassination of her mentor in 1978, she disassociated herself from the terrorist group and emigrated to Mexico, where she studied philosophy and sociology, worked, and raised a family. In 1985 she returned to Spain, something which was publicised in the press, although she refused to make any statements. She was going to rebuild her life. The following year she enrolled in doctoral courses in philosophy at the University of the Basque Country. It was not long before threatening graffiti appeared accusing *Yoyes* of being a “traitor” and a “snitch” (González, 1987).

In September 1986, Dolores González was walking with her three-year-old son and another young child in Ordizia, her home town, which was holding a fair. In the Avenida del Gudari, next to some tractors, they were approached by Antonio López Ruiz (Kubati). “Are you Yoyes?” he asked. She said yes. “Do you know who I am?” “No”, was Dolores González’s reply. “I’m from ETA and I’ve come to execute you,” Kubati announced before shooting her twice, wounding her in the leg and chest. Once on the ground, the gunman finished Yoyes off with a shot to the head. She was 32 years old. She was accused of treason, although she had done nothing different from hundreds of other exetarras without pending cases who had returned to Spain since 1977 (Alonso, Domínguez and García, 2010, and Fernández Soldevilla, 2021).

2.5 Perpetrators of terrorism: victims of their own terrorism

In the summer of 1975 ETApM was practically dismantled. The death of the dictator in November of the same year and the foreseeable democratisation brought about a new scenario. The ideological leader of the *polimilis*, Eduardo Moreno Bergaretxe (*Pertur*), promoted the renewal of the radical Basque nationalism linked to ETA. On the one hand, he promoted mass organisations that were to be joined by a Bolshevik-style party. In order to achieve its ultimate goals, an independent and classless Euskadi, it should act as the leading vanguard of the entire “nationalist left” in order to instrumentalise “bourgeois democracy” by means of an alliance with the extreme left. On the other hand, he proposed that ETApM should become a rear-guard subordinate to the new political force (Alonso, Domínguez and García, 2010, and Fernández Soldevilla, 2013).

This turn of events provoked the most militaristic sector of the organisation, the *Berezis*, who branded *Pertur* a “liquidationist” traitor. At the end of April 1976 they had kidnapped him on the grounds that *Pertur* had failed to comply with certain security measures. They intended to put him on trial and apply the sentence of their own choosing. Only the determined intervention of the rest of the *Polimilis* prevented them from doing so. In a letter from *Pertur* to his family, one could read: “These beasts have created such a climate in the organisation that they have transformed ETA in the northern Basque Country, not into a collective of revolutionaries, but into a police state where everyone suspects their neighbour and the neighbour suspects the other” (Fernández Soldevilla, 2013).

Pertur was last seen on 23 July 1976 in the French Basque Country. According to an eyewitness, that morning, in Saint-Jean-de-Luz, he got into a car with Francisco Mujika Garmendia (*Pakito*) and Miguel Ángel Apalategi (*Apala*), precisely the most prominent leaders of the *Berezis*. Both declared that they had met *Pertur* by chance and that he had asked them to take him to a point near the border with Spain, where he had a mysterious appointment. They allegedly left him there. He was never heard from again (Fernández Soldevilla, 2013).

José Miguel Etxeberria Álvarez (*Naparra* or *Bakunin*), a prominent leader of the *Comandos Autónomos Anticapitalistas*, had a long career that had taken him through the Trotskyist *Liga Comunista Revolucionaria* (LCR), ETApM and ETAm. Disagreements between the authoritarian leadership of the organisation and Etxeberria’s libertarian ideas led him to leave the *milis* and join the *autonomos* at the end of 1978. In 1980,

Naparra, who was looking for new sources of supply, contacted an international arms dealer who was already supplying ETA. To resolve this conflict of interests, the *milis* summoned Etxeberria on 11 June 1980. One of his colleagues took him to the meeting place, Saint-Jean-de-Luz (French Basque Country). He was never seen again. The self-employed denounced that the military branch of ETA had repeated with *Naparra* what it had already done with *Pertur* (Zirikatu, 1999). The possible link was obvious: two of those suspected of having murdered Eduardo Moreno Bergaretxe were Francisco Mujika Garmendia (*Pakito*) and Miguel Ángel Apalategi (*Apala*), former *Berezis* who had joined ETA.

Despite the accusations of their colleagues, there is no conclusive evidence as to what the purpose of these ETAp and CAA leaders was. Nor can we rule out the possibility that *Pertur* and/or *Naparra* were victims of vigilante terrorism or some other type of violence.

3. How to deal with the figure of the perpetrator-victim?

Perpetrator-victims make up the most problematic and controversial category of those that can be found in the historical account of terrorism (Pablo et alii, 2012). They represent an enormous challenge at the academic, memorial, institutional and ethical levels that must be faced seriously, as Galo Bilbao (2009) had done at the moral level.

What to do with them? Let us start with the simplest: the consensus that the right to life is a universal human right that has no exceptions. From this perspective, it is clear that, regardless of their background, whether they had been torturers, high-ranking members of the dictatorship or terrorists, no one had the right to “judge”, “sentence” and murder the people we have mentioned in these pages.

In that sense, it would be a mistake to distinguish between one perpetrator-victim and another depending on what ranks they belonged to or who killed them. Whether they kill in the name of Allah, revolution, reaction, race or homeland, the essence of all terrorist organisations is the same. The same applies to the acts of violence resulting from Franco's dictatorship. Absolutely none of them were legitimate.

The second thing is to establish that in order to classify a victim as a perpetrator-victim, the justifications put forward by Francoist institutions, terrorists or their apologists must never be uncritically assumed. On the contrary, before taking such a transcendental step, it is essential to carry out serious and academic research beforehand, carried out by historians or other social scientists on the basis of verified documentary sources. Only in this way, based on the most scrupulous rigour, will we be able to produce a solid, honest, and truthful account.

Does the fact that a human being suffers a violent death erase - if any - the shadows of his or her past? Do these shadows exclude him or her from being recognised as a victim? From the historian's point of view, the answer to both questions is in the negative. When there is solid evidence that an individual has the dual status of perpetrator and victim, the researcher must record both, assuming the *chiaroscuro* of the character, the blurred boundaries between the different categories and the complex historical conjuncture.

If it does, we do not have the right to erase the black pages of an individual's past. It would be a lie and, ultimately, this distortion could lead to their being transformed into martyrs for a political cause, whatever it may be, and thus into the seeds of new violence. This is precisely what radical Basque nationalism has done with its "fallen" *gudaris*, such as *Txiki* and *Argala*, to name but two, whom it has used as symbolic pieces to construct a political religion that Jesús Casquete (2009) has called *gudarismo*.

What to do with the politics of memory? As Reyes Mate (2013) has argued, each and every one of the victims must be recognised. And this maxim includes the perpetrator-victims. It also seems appropriate to carry out this work with an explicit mention of the acts of violence in which these people lost their lives, stating the facts as they happened and without ignoring their problematic past. This can be done, for example, on social networks, in teaching units or in exhibitions (López Romo, 2022).

However, certain limits must be set. Given that it is completely impossible to separate the two facets that they combine, institutions should avoid commemorative monuments, medals or acts in honour of the perpetrator-victims (as well as the victimizers themselves). Paying homage to Manzanos or Carrero can be interpreted as a glorification of the Franco dictatorship. Paying homage to *Argala* or *Txapela* can be interpreted as a glorification of ETA. Paying tribute to Francisco Javier Martín and Aurelio Fernández can be interpreted as a glorification of the GRAPO. Paying tribute to José Humberto Baena could be interpreted as glorifying the FRAP. And honouring the perpetrator-victims not only means hiding the shadows of these characters and revictimizing their victims, but also an exercise in anti-democratic pedagogy, especially harmful for young audiences.

However, there are some questions that raise doubts that are difficult to resolve. First, would it be appropriate to distinguish between personal and corporate responsibility, that is, between those who had specific blood crimes and those who belonged to the leadership of a dictatorship or a terrorist organisation? The second prevention is related to individuals who were killed not when they were active perpetrators, but when they had already left that vital stage behind, either because they had been released from prison after serving time for the crimes they had committed or because they had benefited from the Amnesty Law of October 1977, which annulled the crime itself, extinguishing all responsibility (Parra, 2021, and Rivera, 2021). Or should they be required not only to have served their sentence or been granted amnesty, but also to have expressed repentance? Finally, is it defensible that, as is now the case, certain terrorists who have been killed in vigilante attacks should be denied the financial compensation due to the victims of terrorism? These questions raise an interesting debate that is far from exhausted.

4. Conclusions

We will return to the two questions with which this paper opened. One on how to fit the perpetrator-victim into a rigorous historical account, and the second on what memory policy should public institutions follow with such a thorny figure.

We must remember the perpetrator-victims, but we must remember everything. We can neither hide their uncomfortable presence nor deny either of the two apparently contradictory faces they present. Like Janus, both form an essential part of such historical figures, who in turn occupy a modest but undeniable place in the narrative of terrorism.

As for the policy of memory, I believe that institutions should recognise the perpetrator-victims, but memorials, medals or acts of homage to those who in life were high-ranking officials of the Franco dictatorship or members of a terrorist gang should be avoided. Such initiatives could lead to the re-victimisation of their victims, as well as sending an undemocratic and dangerous message to new generations: that the violence they perpetrated or encouraged during their lifetime was okay.

Finally, it should be stressed that perpetrator-victims are only a tiny minority of cases. They are by no means representative of the 1,453 fatal victims of terrorism currently recognised by the Ministry of the Interior of Spain.

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Religious propaganda, charitable organizations and jihad. The evolution of the Saudi network, the Maktab al-Khidamāt and the path to al-Qāʿida

Abstract

From the 1980s onwards, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a radicalization campaign was witnessed within the international Muslim community of fundamentalist tradition, which was carried out through the promotion of the concept of jihad. The process, led by some of the main political actors, followed the strategy of global propagation of the Wahhabi-Salafi ideology initiated in the 1960s by Saudi Arabia, which through a system of associations and institutes of solidarity and charity wanted to exert its influence on the umma universally. The system was transformed into a network that became the main instrument for the promotion of religious extremism. The Saudi network then became part of a new entity that emerged on Afghan territory to organize Muslim resistance, the Maktab al-Khidamāt (MAK). The MAK favored mobilization, prepared its members ideologically and militarily, and developed a system of alliances between factions. In one of its training camps, a paramilitary jihadist group was later formed that used the MAK as a base for recruitment: this group would become the al-Qāʿida terrorist organization.

Keywords: Jihad, MAK, al-Qaeda, Saudi Arabia, Wahhabi-Salafism

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1. Introduction

The international geopolitical scene underwent a radical change in the second half of the 20th century. Saudi Arabia decided to participate in the political mutation by presenting itself as the representative of the entire community (*umma*); it presented the *Wahhabi* doctrine as the true and only form of Islamic religious interpretation and established a strategy for the global propagation of its own belief. The aim was to maintain control of believers around the world by standardising the doctrine according to its ideological imposition. It is important to highlight the role played by religion in the formation of the Kingdom: Saudi Arabia was born under the ideological banner of Wahhabism¹, had a legal structure based on the application of the *Sharī'a* in accordance with the Hanbali school of *fiqh*² (DeLong-Bas, 2004:95-7) and modelled the organisation of the state on the principle of necessity professed by Ibn Taymiyya³, according to which religion (*dīn*) and state (*dawla*) could not exist without each other (Campanini, 2015:21).

The global dissemination of Wahhabi ideology was part of a soft power strategy, the success of the Saudi plan depended on the control of the community and the realisation of the programme could make them the protectors of the authentic religious message, while giving them the opportunity to play a leading role on the Middle Eastern stage. It was also essential to gain legitimacy in the eyes of Muslims and to eliminate the movement's violent image, which is why Saudi Arabia sought to open its doors to the outside world.

The programme drawn up by King Abd al-ʿAzīz ibn Saʿūd initially consisted of the imposition of a political-economic system that would attract foreign powers, constituting a privileged market line linked to the sale of oil and the acquisition of military equipment and political protection. At the same time, he saw the creation of a system of personal mobilisation towards the peninsula, with the intention of culturally and socially training young Muslims, people with a low level of education and academic staff (especially

1 The Wahhabi movement emerged in the 18th century as a new religious interpretative form with strong political implications. It promoted the renewal of a decadent society through a return to the message of Revelation; true monotheism could only be realised by following the Holy Sources (*Qur'an* and *ḥadīth*) and the example of the first three generations of Muslims (*salaf al-ṣāliḥ*). At the doctrinal level it emphasised the concepts of the oneness of God (*tawḥīd*), rejecting every association (*shirk*), innovation (*bid'a*), interpretation (*ta'wīl*), giving great importance to the practice of jihad. It is considered an extremist and violent interpretation of Islam (Esposito, 2003:333).

2 *Fiqh* refers conceptually to the effort of human beings to understand the divine law (*Sharī'a*); contrary to the *Sharī'a*, which is immutable and infallible, *fiqh* is mutable and fallible. It also refers to the system of Islamic jurisprudence created in the 8th century by Muslim scholars interested in bringing to life a corpus of rules of behaviour based on God's will. From the beginning, different opinions emerged, especially regarding the validity and nature of the sources to be used in interpreting the *Sharī'a*; four authors in particular gained great influence, respectively Abū Ḥanīfa, Mālik ibn Anas, Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi'ī and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, who gave the names to the four schools of *fiqh* that would be the juristic references since the gates of the *ijtihād* closed (Esposito, 2003: 87; Otto, 2010:23).

3 Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) was a Syrian 'ālim adherent to the neo-Hanbalid school, he focused his studies on Qur'anic exegesis, *ḥadīth*, *fiqh* (issuing *fatāwā*) and in the religious field he emphasised the concept of *tawḥīd* and a literal application of the *Sharī'a* in accordance with the first three generations of Muslims. He promoted the importance of the primary sources and the first three generations of Muslims, opposing the *Sunna al-nabī* to every innovation (*bid'a*). He theorised his notion of the Islamic state erected on religious principle and the worship of God (*ibāda*), indicating *al-Hisba* (promotion of what is good and prohibition of what is evil) as the ultimate realisation of Allāh's will. Jihad, military effort for the defence of religion, was the way for the preservation of order and the triumph of faith. Living through the Mongol occupation he theorised on the subject of holy war: he promoted a separation between Muslim individual and state, identifying as Muslim those who respected God's laws and fought for their victory, and indicating as infidels those who were in the opposite position; jihad was the first obligation after faith and its practice distinguished a true believer from a false one (Cook, 2005:93; Hoover, 2019; Laoust, 2000). His extreme position and the possibility of considering regimes that do not represent the true (according to him) Islam as infidels have created an interpretative margin used by contemporary jihadists to justify violent actions in the face of unjust authorities vis-à-vis the community. Considering the *umma* and the Islamic state universally, the obligation of intervention can be considered universal by jihadists, which is why Ibn Taymiyya's works represented and represent the main references for jihadi-Salafi propaganda.

university students), in order to exert his influence on them at a later stage (Farquhar, 2017:3). The instrument for its realisation consisted of *da'wa* (proselytising), by means of which the doctrine could be spread. The first adherents came from Salafi circles, which with Wahhabism had in common the doctrinal apparatus, in particular the most traditional form of Salafism - which contemporary historiography identifies as Salafi purism, and which in some cases may coincide with the same message of Wahhabism, the ideological basis of jihadism (Lauzière, 2016: 9; Wiktorowicz, 2006:207) - which shared with the followers of Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb the identification in the sacred sources and the example of the pious predecessors, both in orthodoxy and orthopraxis. They also had in common the acceptance of the works of important Salafi theologians (such as Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal or Ibn Taymiyya). Much support for the Wahhabi openness also came from the Muslim Brotherhood movements in Egypt, from the *Jamā'a al-islāmīya* of Mawdudi and from other groups that recognised themselves in the doctrine of the pious predecessors (*madhhab al-salaf*).

It was within this complex that the Saudi power group and the '*ulamā*' developed the new line of propaganda from the 1960s onwards, giving life to a wide range of institutes and associations for the control of faith and believers. For the educational sphere, the University of Medina (IUM) was established in 1961, which took over the legacy of the Scholastic Institute and received a large number of Muslims, of Salafi belief, to provide them with academic training that they would use for proselytising operations when, after graduation, they returned to their own country of origin (Farquhar, 2017:71). In addition, a large number of Saudi-trained personnel found employment in leading universities, thus having the possibility of transforming their teachings into tools in the service of propaganda.

The social and religious sphere was controlled through official non-governmental organisations that emerged under the pretext of Islamic solidarity and charity, which managed and registered religious centres, schools and youth activities, and channelled financial aid by setting up special funds and opening offices in different countries around the world. Some of these associations have represented real umbrella organisations, whose purpose was to support illegal and violent activities that in some cases coincided with the support and financing of Islamic terrorist groups. The most relevant of these were certainly the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), founded in 1969 in Jeddah with a diplomatic role on the model of the United Nations, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), which from 1972 onwards dealt with youth issues, and the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), based in Saudi Arabia and dedicated to assisting Muslims, especially in the economic sector.

However, the organisation that most represented the strategy of ideological propagation and global control emerged in May 1962, when King Fayṣal organised a major conference in Mecca, giving life to the *Rābiṭa al-ālam al-islāmī*, known as the Muslim World League (MWL)⁴. The first president was the grand mufti Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm Āl al-Shaykh (a descendant of Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb) and the successor appointed to the General Secretariat was Muḥammad 'Alī al-Ḥarkān, the future Saudi minister of justice. The organisation was established by one hundred and eleven people, divided between '*ulamā*' and members of the Wahhabi high clergy, who were also part of the Constituent Council (Gold, 2003:76). Its

4 The MWL was founded as a non-governmental organisation, set up to propagate the true vision of Islam (of the Wahhabi type) and to aid Muslims around the world. Its dependence on Saudi Arabia was still evident: the MWL's staff, wherever they were in the world, came from the Kingdom or had been trained there, while financial support came from Gulf funds, transmitted through *zakāt*, *waqf* or *ṣadaqa* (Algar, 2002).

launch conference was attended by important personalities in the Salafi purist scene, testifying to the will to establish an important common international network. The MWL opened offices in all countries of the world, centrally controlling the activity of its satellites, managing the belief, and sending specialised personnel. It was the nucleus of a system that became a network, capable of linking different organisations and standardising the message conveyed. The religious message spread through the system, creating an international network of adherents dependent on the Royal Household.

The historic events of 1979, with a particular focus on the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, brought about a change in the strategic line of its foreign policy. Aggression from a Muslim territory forced the Saudis to take matters into their own hands, defending the umma and promoting a call for a war of resistance. Propaganda was radicalised by focusing mainly on the concept of jihad, religiously legitimising the conflict, and inviting international involvement. Within the network created by Saudi Arabia and controlled by the MWL, a strong radicalisation campaign began to take place, with the intention of recruiting fighters, forming the group that some years later would become the pillar of the MAK, which would lead the Afghan resistance and would be the historical predecessor of the terrorist organisation *al-Qāʿida*.

2. Saudi network: jihad propaganda and the defence of dar al-islām.

The invasion of a territory identified as *dar al-islām*⁵, considering the idea of the universality of Islam and its religious community, created the conditions for the conflict to be presented as a sacred struggle justified by religion⁶. Propaganda emphasised the concept of the unity of the umma and its defence, embracing the pan-Islamic current that was developing in the 20th century and transforming the movement - accompanied by Wahhabi-Salafi rhetoric - into the future global jihadist movement (Hegghammer, 2014:258-260).

The MWL led the proselytising campaign by inviting Muslims belonging to its network to join the fight, which was seen as a collective obligation (*fard ʿayn*). Pakistan and the US offered logistical and financial support, while Saudi Arabia stepped up from an ideological-religious point of view by focusing on legitimising jihad and creating a wide range of solidarity organisations to invest money and fund the resistance. At the same time, OIC, WAMY and MSA (and their satellite associations and campuses around the world) worked to find volunteers and money, liaising with the local offices of the MWL, which provided overall coordination. Influential figures in the Kingdom stressed the importance of jihad as an instrument of religious expansion and Muslim struggle. The illustrious Ibn Bāz, grand mufti of Saudi Arabia, an important professor at the IUM and an influential figure in the MWL, was certainly involved in the agenda. Participating in the Afghan jihad

5 *Dar al-islām* designates the territory of Islam, where Islamic law is respected, initially referring to the territories conquered by Muslims. Its meaning is geographical and conceptual and its definition has been constructed in contrast to that of *dar al-ḥarb* (territory of war). The jihadist idea of the universality of the umma has modified the concept, universally transforming *dar al-islām* into any territory where Muslims live, taking the global right of intervention for the defence of religion (Esposito, 2003:62; Cook, 2005; Scarcia, 2015:29-31).

6 The concept of the sacredness of jihad is a debated element within the Muslim religion. Sacred sources have given special prominence to the subject both in the Qurʾān and in *ḥadīth* literature. Sura number 9 (*Sūra al-Tawba*) in particular is one of the most frequently mentioned by jihadists: it is the only one not preceded by the Basmala and contains two of the most violent verses in the Qurʾān: the 'verse of the saving covenant' (9:111) and the 'verse of the sword' (9:5), used by traditionalist Muslims to declare war on all non-Muslims (Cook, 2005; Bonner, 2006; Bonney, 2004; Robinson, 2021).

according to Ibn Bāz represented the greatest form of righteousness (*afḍal al-qurbat*); the struggle further required a total association towards Muslims and a consequent disregard for infidels (concept of *al-walā' wa-l-barā'*) and also included participation of an economic kind (*jihād bi-l-māl*) alongside the military one, which met with the full approval of Wahhabi circles in the Gulf and the United States (Gold, 2003: 111). Another important personality was Muḥammad 'Alī al-Ḥarakān, a native of the Najd who trained at the IUM (becoming one of its directors) and had very good relations with the Royal Family. He held positions of power, answering directly to the Saudis and ensuring the defence of the Islamic religion. He was also secretary general of the MWL and was in charge of organising conferences around the world (Farquhar, 2017:215-6). The league, in fact, continued to be directed towards territorial and ideological expansion activities⁷.

The most significant presence - and one that had the most consequences for the ultimate creation of the global jihadist movement - was probably that of 'Abd Allāh al-'Azzām, at the time a professor at the Jordan University of Amman. An individual who had spent much of his life in the main Muslim territories (Palestine, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and to a lesser extent Pakistan and Afghanistan), he came into contact with personalities belonging to Islamic fundamentalism, who held him in high esteem. He became the ideologue of the new global jihadist theory, articulated according to the principle of *tawḥīd* of action (*tawḥīd al-'amali*), according to which the worship of Allah had to be demonstrated by faith, the study of sacred texts and the performance of individual practices (Hegghammer, 2020:293). Jihad was one of these, which is why al-'Azzām considered combat an individual obligation (*farḍ 'ayn*) and a duty comparable to the five pillars. In Indianapolis he was able to meet the leaders of the main Saudi organisations, especially within the MWL, and it was also the place where the first meeting between him and Osāma bin Lāden took place⁸, laying the groundwork for future collaboration.

The Indianapolis conference was followed by the Kuala Lumpur conference in 1980 and a special MWL congress in Mecca. The strategic agenda, influenced by the Afghan events, explicitly addressed the issue of jihad by combining the propaganda plan with a war plan, and inviting Muslims to mobilise (The Muslim World League, 1992). A year later the instructions of the congress found realisation in the publication of a commemorative work for the 20th anniversary of the MWL entitled “*Rābiṭa al-'ālam al-islāmī: 'ashrūn 'āman 'ala ṭarīq al-da'wa wa al-jihād*” (“Muslim World League: twenty years on the road to *da'wa* and *jihād*”), a text that perfectly outlined the MWL's (and consequently Saudi) strategy. Secretary 'Alī al-Ḥarakān presented in the work the programme, which consisted of defending the territory of Islam by restoring the pre-invasion scenario. The MWL opposed the practice of the sacred Islamic jihad to the attack on the 'Islamic nation', continually pointing out the danger that Muslims faced and the importance of coordination and an international mobilisation of the umma (The Muslim World League, 1981). It is difficult to know who actually worked on the drafting of the important libretto, although the involvement of the heads of official Saudi publications, as well as leading academics from universities and the Wahhabi clergy (*'ulamā'* and the

7 Of the various initiatives undertaken by the MWL in Europe, Africa, Asia and the United States, it is worth drawing attention to a particular conference organised in Indianapolis, at Indiana's Islamic Teaching Center (ITC) in January 1978. The meeting was attended by prominent members of Saudi politics and professors from the most prestigious universities in the Islamic world, among them Muḥammad Quṭb (brother of Sayyid Quṭb and professor at King Abdul University), Shaykh Tāis al-Jumālī (imām and professor at the Kuwait Central Mosque and in close relations with the Muslim Brotherhood), Shaykh Sa'ūd al-Finaisan (director of the Muhammad ibn Saud University of Riyadh) and El-Tigani Abugideiri, director general of several Saudi solidarity associations in the US (Hegghammer, 2020: 111-112).

8 The meeting between al-'Azzām and Bin Lāden has also been confirmed by Bin Lāden's family (Bin Laden et. al, 2009: 25).

ministries of propaganda, education and foreign affairs), seems likely. The involvement of Ibn Bāz (because of his jihadist propaganda efforts and his relationship with al-‘Azzām) and Muḥammad al-Majdhūb, a Syrian member of the Muslim Brotherhood who was a professor at the IUM and editor of the university’s official newspaper, a delegate of the MWL and a personality who maintained close contacts with the Saudi intelligence services, is also likely but not confirmed.

The process of radicalisation of religious propaganda by the MWL was gradually being completed. The proselytising strategy began to be more closely linked to that of al-‘Azzām, who had moved to Pakistan thanks to a professorship at the Islamic University of Islamabad offered by the MWL. It was precisely in Pakistan, thanks to al-‘Azzām, that the MWL reaped the rewards of years of propaganda, taking official control of the resistance and establishing its own headquarters in the town of Peshawar, in the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

3. The Peshawar system and the role of al-‘Azzām. The network of the Rābiṭa and the creation of the Maktab al-Khidamāt.

The Peshawar area represented a strategic point where resistance began to take shape and where most of the radical Islamic components were gathering. Populated by ethnic Pashtūn, the area had witnessed the rise of the influence of the Deobandi religious school and had hosted Afghan fundamentalist exiles who fled after the change of regime in the country.

There operated the network of ‘Abd Rabbi al-Rasūl Sayyāf, an Afghan scholar who identified himself in Wahhabi doctrine and head of the Ittiḥād-i Islāmī party (a party supported by the Saudis, with whom he had a deep relationship). He was also a professor of *Sharī‘a* at Kabul University and ran proselytising operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan, becoming the leader of the mujāhidīn group that led the Afghan resistance. He travelled extensively between the US and Saudi Arabia (and around the Gulf in general), came into close contact with the MWL leadership in 1980 and the following year met al-‘Azzām, who in the meantime was moving permanently to Peshawar convinced by Kamāl al-Sananiri after a meeting the two had in Mecca (Hegghammer, 2020:149). Al-Sananiri was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Secret Apparatus who had arrived in Afghanistan in 1979, where he had established a great many contacts that proved useful in transforming al-‘Azzām into the intermediary between the mujāhidīn and the Arab volunteers who were beginning to arrive. Bin Lāden also began to approach the area in these years, initially offering financial support.

The arrival of al-‘Azzām encouraged interventions by the US and Pakistani diplomatic and intelligence corps to establish themselves in Peshawar, where al-‘Azzām began to have command of the fighters entering the country through the MWL channel. Saudi solidarity organisations began to operate actively in the region, coordinating revenues and providing humanitarian and economic aid to the mujāhidīn. Saudi and Kuwaiti capital financed logistical facilities and operations, the IIRO secured money from mainly Gulf investment funds (such as the Dār al-māl al-islāmī Trust, the Dallah Al-Baraka Holding Company, the BBCI Bank of

Credit and Commerce International) while the various NGOs most prominently present were the Islamic Da'wa Committee, the Islamic Relief Agency, the Saudi Relief Committee and above all the Saudi Red Crescent agency. Along with the Kuwait Red Crescent; all had their own headquarters in Saudi Arabia (Millar Burr J. & Collins R. O., 2006). The head of the Saudi Red Crescent (and also of the Saudi Relief Committee) in the Chitral area was Wā'il Ḥamza Julaīdān, also known as Ḥasan al-Madanī, a Saudi insider who had studied at the IUM and spent part of his life in Arizona. He also had deep friendships with figures linked to the jihadist cause, particularly al-'Azzām and Bin Lāden. Another important person in the agency was Abū 'Ubayda al-Banshīrī, who was particularly distinguished in the jihadist cause.

Aid reached the mujāhidīn through the NGO channel and was mainly intended for the Sayyāf and Wā'il Ḥamza Julaīdān groups (Rubin B. R., 2020), which used MWL (even more involved in propaganda operations), the CIA and the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence, the most important Pakistani intelligence agency) for personnel management. The war had dragged on, the number of fighters had, in fact, increased from 1982 onwards with the arrival of members of the Muslim Brotherhood, Jamā'a al-islāmīya and volunteer fighters from Egypt, Yemen, Algeria and Arab countries. The system, which saw the coordination of the MWL, was known as the 'Peshawar Alliance' and was founded on strong ideological propaganda about the unity of the umma and jihad (Commins, 2006:174).

Saudi Arabia headed the structure, using the MWL and thus avoiding direct involvement⁹. The influence of al-'Azzām in the jihadist movement was growing, curing the ideological aspect of the mujāhidīn by engaging in religious centres, promoting the theme of jihad. The MWL encouraged his ultimate rise, giving him control of territory and making its network of contacts available to him. Al-'Azzām was thus able to access a large number of personal and financial resources, overseeing the entire system. To facilitate the arrival of volunteers and organise the distribution in the different sectors (training camps, logistics, propaganda, worship) in 1984 he founded, together with Julaīdān, an organisation called *Maktab al-Khidamāt al-Mujāhidīn al-'Arab*, transforming Islamic solidarity/charity into military effort. The MAK was born as an evolution of the MWL (Gold, 2003:97), its official medium of communication being the new *al-jihād* newspaper.

The idea of creating the MAK was in al-'Azzām's mind as early as 1983, due to misunderstandings between the different factions (especially between Afghan and Arab mujāhidīn) and the need to create a common ideological line based on Islam (Wahhabi-Salafi type) and jihad. It was divided into four sub-committees, which dealt with training, military affairs and intelligence, health and logistics, and also managed the housing (*mada'if*) of the volunteers (Hegghammer, 2008:93). It incorporated within it the networks operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Sayyāf's and Jalāluddīn Ḥaqqānī's) and the most important personalities from the MWL - as well as from nearby solidarity organisations - and from the global jihadist scene. These will occupy relevant positions in the Department Committee and above all in the Advisory Council, whose heads will be Osāma bin Lāden, Wā'il Ḥamza Julaīdān, and Abū Hajir al-'Irāqī (a close friend of al-'Azzām and an important figure in the Kurdish-Iraqi area). The director of the MAK was evidently al-'Azzām.

9 CIA and ISI activity in recruitment, economic and military support had increased. They sent a large number of weapons and specialised personnel to train fighters. The Saudis, with their General Intelligence Directorate (GID), wanted to avoid direct contact between the US and the mujāhidīn, fearing possible exclusion, so they decided to use the MWL (Dimitrakis, 2013).

Although the functions of the MAK were multiple, the military purpose remained crucial. Al-ʿAzzām then thought of establishing an area dedicated strictly to training. In late 1983 he had a meeting with the wealthy Saudi Ṣaleḥ ʿAbdullah Kamal, head of the Dallah Al-Baraka Holding Company, who took over the financing of the plan with the direct management of the MAK. The project, named “Project Badr”, was realised with the creation of the military camp in the southeast area of Peshawar, precisely in Pabbi, where all the jihadist components would converge.

4. The general test of Pabbi and jihadist militarism. Sada, al-Ma’sada and the road to the Qāʿida al-jihād.

The event of the Badr project set the direction for shaping the new jihadist strategic line of mujāhidīn management. The plan of centralised control and coordination with a physical presence had worked: al-ʿAzzām founded the programme on the concept of a ‘solid base’ (*qāʿida ṣulba*)¹⁰, a territory where Muslims could live under true Islam and receive a true jihadist education (*al-tarbiyya al-jihādiyya*). The aim was to re-establish an Islamic state (*al-dawla al-islāmīyya*) for all Sunni Muslims (Van Linschoten & Kuehn, 2012:61). If Afghanistan was the place to start, jihad was the means to victory. In the meantime, doctrinal education had an essential role and the mosque the same importance as the military field, thus creating a new jihadist culture.

After Pabbi came the Sada project. After the defeat suffered by Ḥaqqānī’s group in Zahawar, al-ʿAzzām decided to open a new specific training camp under the religious-administrative leadership of the MAK and the military guidance of Sayyāf. At Sada, the Holy Texts, the Arabic language and subjects such as philosophy, history and social sciences were studied together, testifying to the importance of Islamic cultural preparation (Hamid & Farral, 2015:84-85). The Sada base could rely on the Saudi network’s personnel embedded in the MAK, and improved its infrastructure from 1986 with the arrival of Abū Burhān al-Suri (a former Syrian military officer with extensive war experience), ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ʿAlī (Muslim Brotherhood veterans) and Alī Muḥammad (US-trained military officer and agent of the American intelligence services and in the future al-Qāʿida). He also had increased support from the CIA, which increased the number of its officers, diplomats and generals sent to Pakistan and increased the financial outlay, channelling the money through the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), founded by the Pakistani Āghā Ḥasan ʿAbidī. The money passed through Saudi supervision (via the MWL) and went directly to the MAK (Bonney, 2004:328)¹¹. Sada became a key centre where qualified personnel worked to prepare the mujāhidīn in all components influencing combat. The scheme envisaged the arrival of mujāhidīn in Peshawar and their transfer to Sada, where they received training and later reached the front line, joining the battalions present (Berger, 2011:25-7).

The first contrasts over Sada came from the more belligerent section of the MAK, initially emerging in relation to the camp’s secretive status: while al-ʿAzzām insisted that the fighters arrive at the time of the

10 Al-ʿAzzām promoted the notion of *qāʿida ṣulba* also in the journal al-jihād. According to Hegghammer it can be argued that the article, interpreted by many analysts as the manifesto of al-Qāʿida, actually had nothing to do with the organisation and simply referred to a strategic-ideological discourse (Hegghammer, 2020:115).

11 It is important to note once again how the MWL staff, who were involved in supervision, had been almost completely incorporated into the MAK.

centre's opening, the group led by Bin Lāden, Abū Hajir and Ḥaqqānī urged more caution, hoping to receive a larger number of Muslims and a higher level of security. Eventually al-'Azzām's line was adopted, which met with discontent especially from Abū Hajir (Hegghammer, 2020:335-6). He asked Sayyāf and Bin Lāden for help, proposing to seek an alternative solution. The concern about not being able to provide essential services to the mujāhidīn - which could drive away fighters by making the propaganda effort futile - was coupled with the fear that the presence of a reduced number of soldiers would not have been sufficient to defend the camp against an enemy attack. The new contemporary global jihadist current began to groan right there.

Al-'Azzām began to favour the arrival in Sada of Arab volunteers, distancing himself from Bin Lāden who, on the contrary, appreciated the presence of non-Arab Muslims in Sada's battalions; he was also dissatisfied with the level of military preparation that was achieved, as he expected a higher quality of training and wanted the fighters to become truly special groups. He put forward the idea of creating a separate detachment from Sada, which would deal exclusively with the military training of the mujāhidīn to form elite jihadist special forces. In October 1986 Bin Lāden instituted the separate camp of al-Ma'sada (translatable with 'tana of the lions') in the province of Jaji (Stenersen, 2017:14-5).

Al-'Azzām promoted the camp, although he remained sceptical about the danger and difficulty of its defence, because of its geographical positioning and proximity to the enemy front. Bin Lāden did not want to give up his position, considered strategic for guerrilla operations against the Soviets. They decided to develop a strategy to protect al-Ma'sada by initially integrating their system with the MAK, until it was secure. Abū 'Ubayda, a leading personality in the SRC, was at the head of the command, Abū Hajir was appointed director of training while supervision was in the hands of Bin Lāden, who invited members of Islamic terrorist organisations to join the cause¹² (Hegghammer, 2020:342-3).

Al-Ma'sada began to follow a different line from the MAK, distancing itself from its schematic trajectory. The camp attracted people who were exclusively interested in the military aspect and who wanted to be trained for combat. It became the real elite jihadist force in the Peshawar system and launched its first operation in 1987, with the so-called 'Operation Badr' in which all the leaders participated. Bin Lāden individualised the new trends within global jihadism and was adept at orienting them towards al-Ma'sada (Cook, 2005:197). As some of the incoming volunteers began to turn directly to Bin Lāden, the al-Ma'sada group began to separate its network from that of the MAK by establishing its own recruitment system. Progress was natural, from 1988 onwards the al-Ma'sada system began to call itself "the Base" (al-Qā'ida) and its group "the people associated with the base" (Hegghammer, 2020:352). From the union of the database containing the names of the jihadists who had frequented his camp Osāma bin Lāden created Qā'ida al-jihād, a jihadist terrorist organisation of Wahhabi-Salafi ideology (Kepel, 2016:361). The founders of the organisation included Abū 'Ubayda, Abū Hajir al-'Irāqī, Abū Ḥafṣ al-Maṣrī or Abū Khālīd al-Maṣrī, but did not include al-'Azzām (Farrall, 2017). These were individuals who had had contacts with the Saudi network and had worked with the MAK. Thus, al-Qā'ida represented the natural evolution of the system¹³.

12 Ayman al-Zawāhirī of the Jamā'a al-Islāmiyya al-Misrī group and Abū Muṣ'ab al-Zarqāwī, leader of jihadist groups in the Mesopotamian area, will appear in al-Ma'sada.

13 The MAK has been recognised by the United Nations, with paragraph 13 of resolution 1828 (2008) as the progenitor of al-Qā'ida and its network as the basic infrastructure for the terrorist group (United Nations Security Council, 2010).

Al-Qāʿida was born with a well-defined structure: it consisted of a Consultative Council (*Shūrā*) and a Committee on *Sharīʿa* and Politics for the purpose of issuing legal opinions (*fatāwā*). It had a Military Committee and a Finance Committee, accompanied by an office responsible for the procurement of arms and explosive material. It also had a delegation for security and intelligence, and another for propaganda (Cordesman & Obaid, 2006:3).

It was a movement based on the purest form of religion, its activity was not bound by territorial borders and had a global dimension, because the aggression experienced by Muslims was global (Stenersen, 2107:21). With the end of the war in Afghanistan, the members of the new organisation, fascinated by the new jihadist ideology that emerged in these training camps, did not abandon the group, whose global character allowed it to continue its activity in any country in the world. Many associations of Salafi belief joined al-Qāʿida, making it one of the largest and most structured terrorist organisations in the world.

The transactional nature of al-Qāʿida drew on the historical trajectory of Islamic fundamentalism, identifying itself in a Wahhabi-Salafi interpretation of Islam, although it emerged from a group of people interested in the military aspect of defending the religion rather than the will of the Saudi establishment (Commins, 2006:157). The political implications have been obvious. The al-Qāʿida board was composed of individuals who had close ties to Saudi Arabia and its network, and who had progressed by joining the MAK. The recruitment of al-Qāʿida was straightforward and saw mujāhidīn interested in reaching a higher level as fighters as its protagonists. After al-ʿAzzām's death in 1989, Bin Lāden took command of the MAK, incorporating it fully into the al-Qāʿida network and transforming it into the largest jihadist organisation that has ever existed.

The religious element has been central to al-Qāʿida propaganda. While its activity still contradicted some Wahhabi principles, presenting the problem of the validity of a jihad proclaimed by an unrecognised authority and the question of causing casualties among civilians and Muslims, the issue can demonstrate how the terrorist organisation emerged from a jihadist current, rather than from Wahhabi-Salafi propaganda. Moreover, membership of the group came from a willingness to practice jihad rather than religious belief, although the propaganda literature disseminated was of a Wahhabi-Salafi type (Commins, 2006:186). The ideological character of the organisation therefore respects an extremist and violent interpretation of Islam whose validity has not been proven. The terrorist actions carried out have testified to the fact that the religious message has served exclusively as an instrument in the service of propaganda and violence, seeking a legitimisation that only a very restricted number of people recognise.

5. Conclusions

If Peshawar has represented the central point where al-Qā'ida found fertile ground to originate, due to particular geopolitical (Afghanistan invasion) and social (years of extremist religious propaganda) conditions, al-Qā'ida has represented the end point of a system of which politics has lost control, causing problems for international security. Analysis of the movement must consider the socio-political elements that have led to its birth. The process of radicalisation of the umma had been favoured by political actors with strategic interests that have allowed the creation of an international fundamentalist network that was incorporated first in the MAK and then in al-Qā'ida. The system of interconnections allowed the mujāhidīn, once they returned to their own countries, to find a well-defined network where they could carry out proselytising activities spreading jihadist ideology. Thus a phenomenon of “return terrorism” was created, which definitively transported the issue of jihad to Western territory.

The aim of this paper is to highlight the role played by Saudi Arabia in the creation of an international network, fed by aid under the pretext of solidarity, which constitutes the ideological and military foundations of the existing terrorist groups. Cells associated with al-Qā'ida are still active, and the influence of the core group remains strong. It is important to continue to study the phenomena by tracing their trajectories from their beginnings, in order to understand the causes that have generated the consequences we are experiencing today. It will be essential to continue to combat religious extremism that expresses itself in violent forms, as well as to continue to block the propagation and support networks that nurture these forms.

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Mauricio Heise

Conceptual analysis of terrorism as a political communication tactic

Abstract

Considering that there is no universally accepted definition of the concept of terrorism, based on the analysis of the factors of the phenomenon and three definitions selected based on their relevance, this article proposes a definition applicable to the various types of terrorism, establishing its main characteristics and the criteria inherent to them.

In this analysis, terrorism is approached as a tactic of organized violence, with motivations based on an ideology or a cause that is intended to make visible, so it can be considered as a form of political communication, because it transmits a political message aimed at previously selected audiences, based on a narrative designed to influence and mobilize.

Keywords: Terrorism, political communication, public opinion, extremist narrative

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1. Introduction

The concept of terrorism generates debate because there is no universally accepted definition of this phenomenon. Academics and security organisations have drawn up definitions that differ from one another in terms of the emphasis they place on some of its constituent elements, establishing different characteristics of the phenomenon. Ideally, of course, there should be a consensus that would allow certain events to be objectively classified as terrorism.

In contemporary times, violence applied in a measured and intimidating way to achieve political objectives has been labelled by some as terrorism and by others as necessary and legitimate actions in the context of the national liberation of a people, the struggle to end the oppression of a social class, the defence of the values of a religion, among other reasons.

What is certain is that this tactic, which is given a name with an imprecise meaning, has been used by secular and religious groups, on the basis of different radical ideologies, constituting a method of struggle and propaganda to achieve political or ideological objectives, generating public commotion in the places where the attacks take place.

Among the efforts to try to define it, in the 1980s Schmid and Jongman (1988) stated that terrorism is: *“A method of repeated violent action, inspired by anxiety, used by individuals, groups, or states, (semi-) clandestinely, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - unlike murder - the immediate target of the violence is not the ultimate goal. Human victims of violence are chosen from the population at random (targets of opportunity) or selectively (symbolic or representative targets) and are used as generators of the terrorist message. The communicative process between the terrorist (or terrorist organisation), victims (or threatened) and principal targets, based on violence or threat of violence, is used to manipulate these principal targets (audience) and turn them into targets of terror, terrorist demands or attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion or propaganda is sought”*.

Another definition states that “terrorism is a method of causing anxiety through repeated violent actions that is employed by (semi-) clandestine individuals, groups or state elements for political, criminal or idiosyncratic reasons, and in which the direct victims of violence are not - unlike in cases of assassination or political assassination - the ultimate target” (Horgan, 2009: 50).

This article aims to contribute to the debate and the search for objectivity in the formulation of a definition of “terrorism”, applicable to the different expressions of this phenomenon, as it would be illogical to have a definition for each of its typologies (nationalist, jihadist, eco-extremist, etc.).

2. Terrorism and Political Communication

2.1 Defining terrorism

The concept of terrorism, although frequently used in the media and academic circles, does not have a universally accepted definition that makes it possible to delimit its meaning and scope, which in practice often means that a given phenomenon of political violence may or may not be classified as terrorism, giving rise to controversy over the concept. Evidently, there are cases of attacks that cause great public commotion, in which, given the motivations and organisational affiliation of the perpetrators, there does not seem to be this dilemma when it comes to classifying the event as terrorist.

It is even known that on occasions governments or political groups have called opponents terrorists in order to deliberately denigrate them and demonise their intentions, taking advantage of the absence of a universally accepted definition. Likewise, there are cases where an event or phenomenon is intentionally or mistakenly referred to as terrorist - or is removed from that category - depending on the ideological prism of the observer, i.e. bias.

The concept of terrorism has a negative and pejorative connotation, so that those who use this form of violence do not wish to be called terrorists, nor, unlike the anarchists of the last century, do they perceive themselves as such, in addition to the subjectivity that comes with the name.

The lack of a definition, structured with academic rigour but broad enough to encompass the different expressions of terrorism (whatever its political or ideological purpose), leads to shortcomings in identifying it, studying its nature and designing courses of action to counter it. Even to enhance measures in the context of international cooperation, it would be a facilitator to have a globally agreed definition.

For its conceptual analysis, we must first situate ourselves in the framework of political violence, because terrorist actions pursue political objectives that are related to a cause they promote or a social change they wish to promote. Although it may seem simple, this characteristic feature is decisive for understanding their nature, since common criminals do not carry out their actions in pursuit of a political strategy or to change the established order.

In addition to its political or ideological motivation, it involves the deployment of violence through a method, and can therefore be described as a tactic. Regardless of the specific objective it pursues, be it the national liberation of a people or the world domination of one religion or another, terrorism is a tactic, in terms of method of struggle and also of propaganda, which is gestated in a clandestine manner.

Continuing with the attributes that this tactic would have, it is clear that violence is exercised in a deliberate, even planned, manner. However brutal the results of terrorist attacks may be, in most cases they are the result of a detailed plan, in which the attack is a one-off act of violence to convey a message that vindicates a cause that the terrorists consider legitimate and for which they have mobilised.

At this point, it is worth clarifying that the ends pursued by groups or individuals with this tactic are political or ideological, so that causing terror is not the ultimate purpose of the actions inherent to this method, but rather an instrument used by its perpetrators to amplify their capacity for coercion, considering that generally those who resort to terrorist tactics do not have the means of a conventional army or the strength of a state: that is, it has traditionally been used by extra-state actors from a position of inferiority.

Notwithstanding the above, terrorism can also be exercised by the state, which, unlike non-state actors, has greater means at its disposal to carry out clandestine or semi-clandestine violence in the context of authoritarian regimes, although this typology is not infrequently excluded when it comes to dealing with the terrorist phenomenon and its classifications.

When referring to the term, there is a tendency to confuse instruments and ends, assuming the simplistic assumption that terrorism seeks to cause terror, and as we have seen, it obviously causes terror, but this does not constitute an objective in itself. Fear in society or in the audiences (authorities, social groups, international actors or others) to whom the message is intended to be sent is aimed at bending wills or directing behaviour towards the terrorists' ends.

It should be specified that terrorist action is understood as "conscious and voluntary human acts involving the use or threat of physical violence for some instrumental purpose, often of a political, religious or sectarian nature. Unlike other forms of violence, terrorist attacks are not primarily aimed at neutralising or destroying the victims but at psychologically influencing their direct or indirect bystanders" (Toboso, 2020: 30).

Fear can modify the normal functioning of society, affecting not only the potential victims, but also social groups or the entire population, which can modify their daily lives, such as going to certain crowded places or using public transport.

Terrorist attacks as forms of attacks also have the facet of communicational acts aimed at generating publicity, giving visibility through public opinion to the political or ideological objective to be promoted, attracting the attention of society in general and of the previously defined audiences of the cause in the name of which they are acting. Terrorism is a violent mechanism for communicating yearnings, frustrations, utopias, and the will to change.

Terrorist attacks generate emotional shock, so they have a greater psychological effect than their direct material consequences and are aimed at conditioning the behaviour of audiences. For this reason, the selection of human or material targets is done by looking for those that have a high symbolic value (Molano, 2010: 225-249) or randomly because they are representative of a category.

The analysis and explanation of terrorism from the perspective of social psychology suggests that it corresponds to a method of socio-political influence, which is exercised deliberately and strategically, being possible to make an analogy with the campaigns carried out by advertisers, since terrorists use violence to direct our attention towards certain real, exaggerated, or fictitious problems and to publicise their own objectives and ideologies (De la Corte, 2007: 41-42).

In this respect, terrorists need the media, the press, and the internet, to give their attacks a greater impact, as they aspire to have their attacks publicised and commented on. “Without press coverage, the impact of terrorists would arguably be wasted, remaining narrowly confined to the direct and immediate victims of the attack, rather than reaching the wider target audience. Only the spread of fear and outrage to a much larger audience can earn terrorists the maximum potential influence they need to effect fundamental political change” (Hoffman, 2007: 10). The communicational dimension of terrorism as publicity is unmistakable. “It is a theatre in permanent search of an audience, which serves to shed light on certain debates and in which the victims are reified for the sake of the objects and symbols that are attacked” (Aznar, 2015: 4).

A topic of discussion to establish a common definition is the fatalities of the terrorist action as a central element that qualifies it as such, not in quantitative terms, but in the fact that people are killed as a result of the application of this tactic, but there is no consensus on this point either. According to the United Nations, a terrorist act is one “intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act” (United Nations, 1999).

In this regard, it should be specified that terrorism is understood as a method of violent actions to condition other actors in a certain direction, based on an ideology and/or a cause, with the central axis being the aims pursued, and where the existence or not of fatalities is not decisive, and it can be classified as a terrorist phenomenon even when there is no evidence of fatalities. On the other hand, the aforementioned United Nations convention places terrorist acts in the context of a situation of armed conflict, excessively limiting its application to such an extent that under this premise we could not consider the 9/11 attacks to be terrorist acts.

Among the wide range of definitions of the nature of the phenomenon, although it includes the allusion to the “non-combatant population”, we can mention the one formulated by Luis De la Corte (2006: 43), who defines terrorism as “a premeditated succession of violent and intimidating acts carried out against a non-combatant population and designed to psychologically influence a number of people far greater than the number of direct victims in order to achieve some objective, almost always of a political nature”.

For his part, Reinares (1998: 15-16) states that it is “a set of violent actions that generate, in a given population group, psychological effects that are disproportionate to their material consequences and whose purpose is to condition the attitudes of that social group and orient their behaviour in a certain direction”.

Likewise, Elorza, Ballester and Borreguero (2005: 43) define it as “a tactic, preferential, although not exclusively political, which consists of the serial and systematic execution of specific violent actions”.

In this respect, there are more than a hundred definitions of terrorism. In a study carried out by Schmid and Jongman (1988), using a questionnaire addressed to experts in the field, it was established that the concept of violence appeared in 83% of the definitions, that of politics in 65% and that of fear or terror in 51%. For this reason, it would not be appropriate to exclude these variables when proposing a definition.

2.2 Proposed definition

On the basis of the above and the three definitions cited above, the proposed definition of terrorism is as follows: tactics consisting of the execution of punctual or serial actions of violence, intimidatory, for political or ideological purposes, in order to influence certain audiences.

This definition derives from it certain characteristics on which there is no consensus in the academic community, but which are recurrent when analysing the definitions in use. These are:

Characteristic	Description
It is a tactic	It corresponds to a method, a covert fighting procedure, which is generally employed on the basis of inferior means.
Involves the use of violence	Involves actions of a violent nature, which are punctual or serial and deliberately executed.
It generates fear	It causes intimidation in society and especially in the groups or categories to which the immediate victims belong. It produces public commotion and psychological effects.
It has political or ideological aims	It seeks to promote a cause, generally associated with a desired transformation at the political level or the establishment of a certain model of society, based on an ideology or the promotion of a cause.
It conveys a message	Terrorist action is communication aimed at publicising a cause and drawing attention to it, using impact, where the audiences are previously defined, with the aim of forcing changes or decisions. The recipients of this "communication", depending on the cause to be promoted, can be political authorities, social groups, international actors and even societies.
It has a double dimension: attack and communication	The execution of violence through attacks represents a form of struggle, i.e., attacks, and simultaneously a form of communication to draw attention to the objective pursued. It should be made clear that conveying the message is more important than defeating the enemy (which is usually not feasible).

Table 1: Characteristics of terrorism

Source: Own elaboration.

Also, in this approach, for a phenomenon to be considered as terrorist, each characteristic needs to meet at least one of the proposed criteria:

Characteristic	Criteria
It is a tactic	• Secret planning and covert execution of specific acts of violence, by organisations, groups or individual actors. • Secret planning and overt execution of specific violent actions by organisations, groups or individual actors..
Involves the use of violence	• Threat of use of violence against people, infrastructure, facilities, means of transport, among others. • Execution of violence in a punctual or serial manner on people, infrastructure, facilities, means of transport, among others. • Threats and execution of violence, simultaneously or sequentially, on people, infrastructure, facilities, means of transport, among others.
It generates fear	• It attracts attention or media impact, whether in attacks against human or material targets. • Produces anxiety and fear, even if there is no fear of being a victim, whether in attacks against human or material targets. • Produces anxiety and fear of being a victim in people related to a certain category, whether in attacks against human or material targets.
It has political or ideological aims	• Seeks to influence decisions of authorities, state powers or international actors. • Promotes or asserts a claim against the established order. • Promotes or vindicates a cause, political or cause-based. • Promotes or claims a political aspiration. • Promotes or claims an ideology or ideology.
It conveys a message	• It expresses a claim against the status quo and a yearning for a different reality. Seeks to condition certain audiences. • Expresses a claim against the status quo and communicates the will to promote change. Seeks to condition certain audiences.
It has a double dimension: attack and communication	• Action involving the use or threat of violence to inflict harm and communicate a grievance against the status quo, based on political or ideological objectives.

Table 2: Criteria for characteristics

Source: Own elaboration.

The proposed definition is applicable to the different existing typologies of terrorism in terms of the specific forms in which it manifests itself according to the political and/or ideological objectives sought by the perpetrators, i.e. the five types of terrorism in Post's (2004) classification: 1) social revolutionary, 2) right-

wing, 3) nationalist separatist, 4) religious extremist and 5) derived from specific issues, such as animal rights or environmental defence.

It also includes other forms of terrorism that may arise in the future, as it is a mutable phenomenon. “From its modern origins to the present day, terrorism is a phenomenon that has not ceased to evolve and change. It adapts very efficiently to the signs of the times. That is why monitoring its evolution is so important to differentiate what is truly terrorism and what is not” (Pérez, 2020).

2.3 Political communication and terrorist narrative

The irruption of social networks and people’s immediate access to information has not rendered the “propaganda by the fact” of 19th century anarchist attacks obsolete. On the contrary, it is precisely the virtual environment and also the traditional media that are essential for the perpetrators of these acts of violence, committed under different ideologies, to reach wider audiences, since communication is the central pillar in the actions of terrorism. In this sense, the most recurrent example, but which in turn represents the “best” example of this, is the Daesh organisation and its sophisticated audio-visual production.

The communication deployed by terrorists can be categorised as political in terms of their aims. For Cotteret (1997), political communication establishes the voluntary interaction of a political message from the sender to the receiver, with the intention of pulling the receiver in a certain direction, so that he or she cannot move in any other direction. As mentioned above, terrorism seeks to influence particular audiences.

Evidently, the use of the concept of political communication to describe terrorist activity does not refer to governmental communication or political marketing, but to activism based on a cause, political project or ideology, with the purpose of influencing or orienting behaviour in the recipients of the message.

In the sense of the above, considering that terrorist actions fulfil a communicative function, terrorist attacks produce effects based on the information provided in the media (Toboso, 2020: 115):

- Surprise: A terrorist attack is an unforeseen event that generates fear.
- Confusion: After the attack, confusing, late, distorted or untruthful information.
- High impact: Attacking symbolic targets causes impact.
- Destabilisation: Disrupts all layers of society, with political, economic and social effects.
- Urgency: Demand for immediate information, with the risk of it being generated hastily or recklessly. Information needs to be disseminated through official means that has been corroborated.

Terrorist attacks are violent political actions that, in addition to destabilising, seek to generate audiences, activate them, polarise society and structure a certain discourse, within the framework of a broader strategy, so it is common for terrorist groups to also use other tactics of a political nature, such as hybridising

with movements or parties to achieve their objectives, an example of this being ETA's relationship with Herri Batasuna (Cañete, 2019: 19).

The impact on public opinion and other effects on society are desired by terrorists: even the perpetrators in the framework of their narrative commonly put forward arguments legitimising terrorist activity (De la Corte, 2007: 48):

- Arguments and beliefs that specify and criticise certain social injustices, threats or grievances committed against a reference group of terrorist groups.
- Arguments and beliefs that identify an institutional or social enemy who is held responsible for such injustices, threats and grievances and whose image is devalued to the point of dehumanisation or demonisation.
- Arguments and beliefs that express a positive social identity common to terrorist groups and their reference group.
- Arguments and beliefs that specify the collective goals to which the reference collective of terrorist groups should aspire and that specify the violent activities deemed necessary to achieve these goals.
- Arguments and beliefs that predict a future state in which terrorist groups would have achieved the collective goals set and pursued through violence.

From this narrative, which is common to different forms of terrorism, we can see the importance of collective identity in the motivations of those who deploy violence to make a cause visible, appealing to belonging to a religious, ethnic or social group, among others, as opposed to an enemy who is the cause of the evils, on the basis of which the activists of the cause are mobilised. This discourse is expressed in communiqués announcing attacks, in the speeches of terrorist leaders, in publications on websites and audiovisual content.

For terrorists, it is important to seek social support for their actions, mainly from members of their reference group, and ideally to broaden their support base, so their narrative is often expressed simply, using slogans and rhetorical resources, since their most important theatre of operations is not the physical place where the attacks are carried out, but public opinion and, of course, the enemy responsible for the grievances against which the terrorist mobilisation has been generated.

Finally, it is necessary to point out that the media have a responsibility not to contribute to terrorist aims through an adequate treatment of the news related to attacks and actions of radical groups, avoiding the use of language or stories that show sympathy towards extremists or euphemisms that minimise the facts and even justify them, being more recurrent the occurrence of this situation when it comes to terrorism of nationalist groups that fight from the conception of "oppressed people". The press has an effect on public perceptions, on the processes of violent radicalisation and on the capacity of violent groups to mobilise new activists.

3. Conclusion

This reflection on the concept of terrorism and its characteristics aims to generate a proposal for a definition, from an academic perspective and endowed with the greatest possible objectivity. In this sense, the emphasis is placed on the motivations of the perpetrators, where violence is used as a means of political communication.

Political and/or ideological motivations are the central and differentiating element with respect to other acts of violence, whether terrorist incidents occur in contexts of peace or war, with or without fatalities. Even the legitimacy of terrorist action is not a defining factor because it implies subjectivity and bias on the part of the observer.

Terrorism as organised terror and a method of socio-political influence is aimed at producing psychological effects on certain audiences at the national or international level, as it causes fear, producing an impact on everyday life. In this sense, terrorism is a tactic that involves the use of violence, generates fear, has political and/or ideological aims and conveys a message. Its narrative is commonly associated with a reference collective and the moral justification of violence.

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Enrique Herrero

Terrorism in the Philippines: historical evolution and current scenario

Abstract

Since the days of Spanish colonisation and subsequent occupation by the United States, the political reality of the Philippines has been characterised by a constant struggle for control over its identity and territory. A largely Catholic country, the Philippines found a relatively stable democratic transition after independence in 1946, passing under the iron rule of the Marcos family for more than two decades (1965-1986). During all this time, the Philippines has been facing a complex scenario of insecurity, historically caused by two reasons: on the one hand, the ever-presence of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), whose armed wing, the NPA, has been pursuing the establishment of a communist regime in the islands for decades; and, on the other hand, the complex evolution of the Moro nationalist movement, whose Islamist leanings have been exploited in recent years by jihadist groups to implement their fundamentalist agenda in the Bangsamoro. In this context, the election of Ferdinand 'Bongbong' Marcos as the new president opens up an uncertain future for the country, which is torn between finding a formula for peace and returning to the authoritarian origins of his father.

Keywords: Philippines, terrorism, Communist Party of the Philippines, jihadism, Bangsamoro

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1. Introduction

The Republic of the Philippines is an island state in Southeast Asia composed entirely of more than seven thousand islands, which are located between the island of Taiwan to the north and the Celebes Sea to the south, and which in turn bathe its coasts between the South China Sea and the Philippine Sea from west to east. A country of Catholic tradition after its extensive colonial legacy, the Philippines would belong to the Spanish crown for more than 300 years, during which time it would become Spain's main enclave in Far Eastern waters. After the end of the Spanish-American War of 1898, the Philippines came under de facto US control, and was not fully liberated until 1946, when its independence was officially recognised.

After the end of World War II, the Philippines began its own process of national reconstruction through the modernisation of its economy and the consolidation of its democracy, a project that was cut short when Ferdinand Marcos (1917-1989) came to power in 1965. Marcos ruled the country's politics with an iron fist for more than 20 years, and was not removed from office until 25 February 1986. On this date, celebrated as one of the great milestones in Philippine political history, the so-called People Power Revolution or EDSA Revolution will be held, a popular mobilisation that will put an end to the Marcos regime and restore democracy to the country.

Thus, after 30 years of relative political stability in the executive, Rodrigo Duterte's arrival to power in 2016 will mean an increase in the police state and violence on the country's streets, as part of his particular fight against drug trafficking and organised crime. This new policy, heavily criticised by some international organisations, has claimed the lives of up to 30,000 people in this period alone (HRW, 2021), and its effects have lasted until the present day.

It is against this backdrop of violence that the former dictator's son, Ferdinand 'Bongbong' Marcos Jr. will win the last elections in May 2022. This victory has been viewed with scepticism by various sectors of Philippine society, who see him as a supposed prolongation of Duterte's executive, as well as a possible return to his father's authoritarian origins.

At present, the election of 'Bongbong' Marcos as the new president - even pending the official results - has raised doubts about the future management of his government, especially with regard to the fight against drug trafficking¹ and counter-terrorism (Rappler, 2021). For decades, the Philippines has been facing a communist paramilitary group - the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the New People's Army (NPA) - as well as a secessionist-Islamist movement in the south of the country. This movement has been instrumentalised in recent years by jihadist groups such as the Abu Sayyaf, or the current Dawla Islamiya coalition, in order to apply their fundamentalist interpretation of Sharia law. This fact, together with other social problems such as high levels of poverty and inequality, and territorial disputes with China, threaten to make the Philippines a focus of regional instability in the Asia-Pacific area.

1 According to some official estimates, around 2% of Filipinos - about 1.8 million people - are reported to be regular drug users in the country - mainly marijuana and methamphetamine or shiba - which has been questioned by some of the country's independent media.

2. Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP): from its anti-colonial past to its designation as a terrorist group

After centuries of colonial abuse and foreign interference, the Philippines achieved its longed-for national independence on 4 July 1946, the symbolic date on which President Franklin D. Roosevelt officially recognised the archipelago's sovereignty. The process of national liberation was an arduous one - two colonial wars and a Japanese occupation attest to this - demonstrating the historic desire of the Filipino people to become a newly independent state.

However, despite the general feeling of enthusiasm in the country in the first months after independence, the political situation in the Philippines was not to change much. Under the first president of the nation, Manuel Roxas (1892-1948), the United States would continue to be the Philippines' preferential partner in its commercial exports, while committing the Philippine state to the maintenance of American military bases and ships in its territory for a period of 99 years (Machuca Chávez, 2019). This openly pro-American stance would be opposed by the first Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP-1930), which would end up being banned by order of Roxas in 1948.

As a result of ideological divergences with the PKP, Jose Maria Sison, a spiritual leader and revolutionary activist, opted to leave the party and form the new Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in 1968. The year after its creation, the New People's Army (NPA) was founded as the armed wing of the renewed communist formation (CPP-NPA).

2.1. New People's Army (NPA): main operations and activity to date.

Following the schism within the PKP, the CPP-NPA, with a markedly anti-liberal and anti-US character, sought through armed struggle to establish a communist state in the Philippines and to expel all US influence from the islands, relying on the popular support of the peasantry (CISAC, 2018). Acting on these objectives, the group led by Jose Maria Sison intensified its armed and political activity throughout the 1970s and 1980s, coinciding with the regime of former dictator Ferdinand Marcos since his election in 1965.

With his election as leader of the Nationalist Party, the Philippines experienced intense economic growth under the dogma "Stability first, representation later", which perfectly defined Marcos' political thinking throughout his mandate (Naidu, 1985). After the first years of economic prosperity and stability, the economic crisis of the late 1960s brought in its wake a series of popular protests and student demonstrations in the streets of Manila. It was precisely in the midst of these protests that the Plaza Miranda attack took place in 1971, which resulted in the death of nine people and a hundred injured (Fernandez, 2021).

This attack, the authorship of which is still unknown², was an important turning point in the country's recent history, as it would serve as Marcos' justification for the implementation of Martial Law³ in 1972 (Overholt, 1986). The CPP-NPA then proceeded to create a new political formation, the National Democratic Front (NDF), in 1973, which brought together the CPP-NPA and the National Democratic Front (NDF) to form the National Democratic Front (NDF).

Following the implementation of Martial Law and the suspension of civil rights, the CPP-NPA proceeded to create a new political formation, the National Democratic Front (NDF) in 1973, to bring together the various leftist factions in the country. For the next three years, the CPP-NPA continued to enjoy logistical support from China in its communist struggle. However, it was in 1976 with the normalisation of diplomatic relations between the Marcos regime and Maoist China that several CPP leaders were arrested. It was not until 1981, with the lifting of the notorious Martial Law, that the Communist Party was able to re-organise.

After years of restructuring and recruitment in rural villages (1981-1984), CPP-NPA attacks on security forces and government officials became increasingly frequent. This military resurgence, coupled with the political fragility of the regime, led to an escalation of the conflict between forces loyal to Marcos and the communist guerrillas in 1985, resulting in the deaths of thousands of people in the process.

Thus, with the fall of the Marcos regime in 1986 and the subsequent release of political prisoners, peace negotiations between the NDF and the new government of Corazon Aquino (1933-2009) took place in December of the same year. The negotiations, however, came to an end only a month later, when Philippine army forces opened fire on a large group of protesters on 22 January 1987 (Curaming 2013)⁴. The so-called "Mendiola Massacre" would result in great popular outrage among Filipinos, as well as the NDF's withdrawal from the negotiations. This unilateral decision to withdraw from the negotiations led the Aquino executive to officially declare war on the group from then on.

In the following years, the CPP-NPA would experience major setbacks for its organisation, from the arrest of some of its main leaders to the death of many of its members. As a result, the group disintegrated, leading to the formation of new parties, associations and non-governmental organisations throughout the 1990s. Since then, peace talks between the NDF and successive governments in Manila have alternated with episodes of violence, with the United States officially designating the Communist Party as a terrorist organisation in 2002. In 2010, new peace negotiations took place between the executive of Benigno Aquino III and the CPP, albeit without success. It was then under the jurisdiction of Rodrigo Duterte's government that the group was again declared a terrorist organisation in 2017 (La Vanguardia, 2017).

2 The Plaza Miranda attack remains the subject of much controversy to this day. Various sectors of Philippine society at the time saw Marcos as the mastermind of the attack, having taken advantage of the situation to pass Martial Law and thus gain a foothold in political power. Other sources, on the other hand, pointed to Communist Party leader Jose Maria Sison as the perpetrator of the attack to incite protests and thus bring about the fall of the regime in the country.

3 Among the reasons given by Marcos for the legitimisation of the controversial law, the Plaza Miranda attack would constitute for him sufficient "evidence" of a "gigantic communist conspiracy" against his government.

4 The so-called "Mendiola Massacre" refers to a demonstration called by the peasant group KMP to demand the implementation of agricultural reforms throughout the country, a march that was joined by sympathisers from other groups. According to some investigations, the alleged presence of infiltrated CPP-NPA members among the demonstrators is said to have led to the shooting, causing a total of 13 deaths.

Since then, the group has remained almost “neutralised” and on the verge of disappearing, although there have been spikes in activity in the northern part of the island of Mindanao this year (Rappler, 2022). In a recent communiqué on 13 May, the Communist Party of the Philippines condemned on its website the election of Bongbong Marcos as the new president, calling his future government “illegitimate” and calling on the civilian population to maintain the “counter-revolution and the “armed prolongation of the conflict” (PRWC, 2022).

3. “The Mindanao Problem”: from the Moro national liberation movement to jihadist insurgency

Parallel to the armed insurgency led by the Communist Party and the NPA since the late 1960s, another nationalist-Islamist movement sprouted in the southern Philippines, threatening the territorial integrity of the archipelago: the process for the self-determination of the Bangsamoro or Islamic Mindanao.

3.1. The Moro Nationalist Movement in Islamic Mindanao

Since the time of Spanish colonisation, a self-determination movement known as Bangsamoro (“Moro nation”) has existed in the southern Mindanao region. The term Bangsamoro refers to the thirteen Muslim tribes spread across the territory who are said to “possess distinct cultures and dialects but share a common belief in Islam” (Taya, 2007).

The origins of the movement date back to the years of US interference, when, at the request of the US, the Philippine government tried to promote the political and cultural integration of these tribes within Filipino-Christian nationalism. With a markedly anti-colonialist and Islamic character, nationalism in the Bangsamoro grew after the country’s independence. 1968 saw the so-called “Jabidah massacre”, a mutiny against the military conscription proposed by the Marcos regime that ended with the execution of some 200 rebels and further fuelled Moro nationalist discourse in the area.

Thus, in the face of the Muslim population’s growing discontent with their government and increasing tensions with the Christians in the south, the first secessionist groups were founded in the region, such as the MIM (Mindanao Independent Movement) and the BMLO (Bangsa Moro Liberation Organisation), which, despite lacking sufficient popular support in the area, managed to lay the foundations for the creation of the future MNLF or Moro National Liberation Front in 1972.

With the founding of the MNLF, the Moro insurgency became much more violent in the Bangsamoro, making the MNLF the main national liberation group until the 1990s. According to some estimates, in the first four years of the conflict alone, “about 150,000 Bangsamoro would be killed in the first four years of the

conflict, more than 500,000 would be forced into exile (...), and more than 1 million would end up homeless and destitute” (Taya, 2007).

During these years, the MNLF was to count on the support of the Libyan regime of Muammar al-Gaddafi, who would supply arms to the group in line with his ideal of pan-Arabism. However, after a meeting with Gaddafi, Imelda Marcos, the dictator’s wife, managed to get Gaddafi to cease his arms support for the group, leading the MNLF to sign the Treaty of Tripoli in 1976.

As a result of this treaty, the MNLF lost many followers, and the following year the Muslim theologian Salamat Hashim created the so-called Mora Islamic Liberation Front or MILF in 1977. The MILF gradually replaced the MNLF as a reference point in the struggle for the liberation of Muslim Mindanao, with the first attack by this group against the Christian population occurring in 1986. In the same year, MNLF representatives led by Nur Misuari initiated peace talks with the recent government of Corazon Aquino for the implementation of an Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (RAMM). These negotiations were not supported by the MILF, which initially opposed partial autonomy for the Bangsamoro in the name of independence.

Thus, after the failure of peace talks in 1987, it was not until two years later that Corazon Aquino unilaterally proclaimed Act 6734 of 1989 for the holding of a referendum on Bangsamoro autonomy. Of the 13 provinces asked to join the RAMM, only four agreed to join, losing even the support of the MNLF for the holding of the referendum.

The MNLF’s unsuccessful attempts to gain independence for the region eventually led to a more radical wing of the group deciding to break away, founding in 1990 the group known as Abu Sayyaf or Al Harakat-Al Islamiya, which has a strong jihadist influence.

3.2. Abu Sayyaf and the spread of jihadism in the Bangsamoro

In 1990, Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, a former combatant in the Afghan war and a member of the MNLF since his return to the Philippines, decided with other members the founding of the jihadist group Abu Sayyaf to proclaim an Islamic state in the area (Rogers, 2004)⁵. With a radical Islamist ideology, Abu Sayyaf soon gained notoriety on the islands of Jolo (Sulu) and Basilan, where he carried out several bomb attacks against the Christian population in the area.

Despite the efforts of the MNLF and MILF, and their repudiation of the brutal methods employed by Abu Sayyaf, the group enjoyed some popularity among the lower classes in the Bangsamoro as a result of the poor living conditions of the Moorish population in the region during the 1990s. With the same objective as its parent organisation, Abu Sayyaf pursued the establishment of an independent Islamic state in the region, albeit governed by a much more fundamentalist vision of Sharia. Thus, after a series of bombings, kidnappings, and

5 A brother-in-law of the iconic Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden reportedly met with Janjalani for the creation of an Islamic separatist group on the islands of Sulu and Basilan in western Mindanao around 1990.

attacks, mostly targeting the region's Christian population, Abdurajak Janjalani was killed by the Philippine police in 1998.

Janjalani's death dealt a severe moral blow to the group, which saw in him its main leader and ideological driving force. As a result, the organisation was split into two subgroups, thus losing the terrorist link with Al Qaeda. In order to survive the loss of its leader and obtain a new source of income to guarantee its survival, the group gradually specialised in the international kidnapping of tourists, such as the one that took place in a Malaysian resort in 2000 (Fuller, 2000).

The recruitment of tourists and locals was a lucrative activity for the group during those years, and it was not until four years later that Abu Sayyaf returned to terrorist activity in February 2004. The attack on Superferry 14 in Manila Bay killed 116 people, making it the deadliest maritime attack to date and the bloodiest attack in Philippine history. Abdurajak's brother and direct successor, Khadafi Janjalani, was neutralised in 2006, returning the group to the ostracism of kidnapping and bringing the era of large-scale attacks to an end.

Khadafi's death opened a new operational stage within the group where "bomb attacks and assassinations were replaced by kidnappings in exchange for ransom" in what could be described as a new involution into a criminal organisation rather than a terrorist group (Aguilera, 2020). After almost a decade without major incidents, it was the agreement between MILF fighters and members of the Benigno Aquino III government for the establishment of the RAMM in 2014 that led to a new attack by the Abu Sayyaf against a group of the faithful in July of the same year (Pareño, 2014). This attack was to be claimed by Isnilon Totoni Hapilon, charismatic leader of Abu Sayyaf in the region, who weeks later issued a video statement pledging allegiance to the Islamic State terrorist group (CEP, 2022)⁶. Following the announcement, several attacks and kidnappings followed, with IS designating Hapilon as the new emir and leader of the terrorist organisation in the Philippines two years later, in 2016.

Just one year later, on 17 May 2017, jihadist groups seized the southern town of Marawi in what was to become a five-month-long armed conflict that left thousands of dead in its wake. After taking control of large parts of the city and some official buildings, President Duterte, in response, decreed the application of martial law throughout the territory and ordered the suspension of habeas corpus in order to stop the terrorist threat (Amnesty International, 2017).

The "siege of Marawi" resulted in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, as well as the destruction of infrastructure and many civilian lives. The fighting came to an end in October, when Philippine military officials claimed to have killed two of the main architects of the siege, Omar Maute - co-founder of the Maute Group with his brother Abdullah - and Hapilon in October. For some international organisations, the battle of Marawi represents the "most significant incursion" of the Islamic State in Southeast Asia, as well as one of its most violent manifestations (Amnesty International 2017).

In the following three years, new attacks followed, such as those on the island of Basilan in 2018 (Ben Saga, 2018) or the two suicide bombings against the Cathedral of Our Lady of Mount Carmel on the island of Sulu

⁶ According to official Philippine military sources, Islamic State leaders in Syria reportedly contacted Hapilon in 2014 with a view to establishing an Islamic caliphate in the Mindanao region, joining with other Islamist groups loyal to Hapilon.

in 2019 and 2020 respectively (ICG, 2022). These attacks resulted in high death tolls and plunged the region into the terror of the growing jihadist threat. However, since 2019, cooperation between RAMM leaders and the Philippine executive to contain the jihadist threat seems to be bearing fruit, relegating groups such as the BIFF (Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters), the Maute Group, currently DI Lanao, or the Abu Sayyaf itself - all collectively known as Dawlah Islamiya - to sporadic episodes of violence. However, despite this decline in terrorist activity, aspects such as the high risk of social exclusion and the lack of opportunities continue to be two of the main breeding grounds for the recruitment of young people in the region, as well as for their subsequent radicalisation into jihadist activity.

4. Counter-terrorism policy and future expectations

With the start of peace negotiations between the MILF and the government of Benigno Aquino III in 2012, a historic process of national reconciliation began, culminating in the installation of a new government in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in March 2014. Through this agreement, both parties agreed on the cessation of hostilities, as well as the approval of the RAMM as its own autonomous body through a plebiscite in 2019.

The situation of insecurity in the south of the country as a result of the incipient presence of jihadist groups led both parties, both the central government and the transitional authority, to improve cooperation in anti-terrorist matters. Since 2007, counter-terrorism policy has been regulated by the Human Security Act, but it was not until 13 years later that the Anti-Terrorism Act 11479 (2020) was enacted. This law, passed under the auspices of President Duterte, redefines the criminal concept of terrorism in the country, as well as the measures and sanctions applied to it.

In response, human rights groups and civil society groups expressed dismay at the new law, which would give “excessive powers” to the Duterte government, as well as an overly lax framework for the executive to act in counter-terrorism matters (Amnesty International, 2020). Under the law, the range of offences that can be charged as terrorism, such as “threatening or inciting to commit terrorist acts”, was expanded, allowing for extrajudicial arrests, and extending the maximum time a suspect could be held in police custody from 3 to 24 days (EFE, 2020). This amendment was reportedly interpreted by some experts and rights organisations as a move by Duterte to “brand and persecute” dissent, as well as any opponents suspected of being “enemies of the state” (EFE, 2020).

Despite the evident opposition of large sectors and social groups in the country to the implementation of the Anti-Terrorism Law, it has led to a notable decline in jihadist activity in recent years, due in large part to the coordinated activity of RAMM authorities alongside official government forces during this time. This cooperation has in turn led groups such as Dawla Islamiya to maintain a more ‘defensive’ but definitely ‘not extinct’ profile in the area (ICG, 2022). The materialisation of the RAMM as a political entity, together with the efficient performance of the security forces in the fight against jihadism, has reduced the levels of violence in the region and driven many young people away from enlisting in these organisations. However,

attacks such as those on the Sulu Cathedral, or the recent clashes between jihadist groups and the security forces in the south of the archipelago (Méndez, 2022) highlight the resilience of these groups in recruiting members and reorganising themselves.

5. Conclusions

The election of Bongbong Marcos as the new president of the Philippines raises a number of questions regarding the future management of his government in the fight against jihadism. Unlike his rival in the elections, Leni Robredo, Marcos has not yet announced exactly what his government's policy will be in this area, although some analysts are already predicting a continuity with his predecessor, largely due to the family ties between the future vice-president, Sara Duterte, and the former president - they are father and daughter.


Some experts believe that Marcos's accession to power could jeopardise the peace agreements reached with the MILF over the Bangsamoro region, thereby affecting progress made in the fight against terrorism. His father's political legacy, together with historical feuds between his father's family and members of the MILF and the local Moorish population, could play a decisive role in the future course of events, even jeopardising the region's autonomy. For other authors, however, the new leader's long political and military experience should serve as a sufficient guarantee for him to repair tensions with the local population and reach agreements with other groups (Chew, 2022).

On the other hand, regarding the possible future of jihadism in the region, it is worth noting that on 2 March, official Philippine government sources announced the identity of the new leader of Dawla Islamiyah: Fahrudin Hadji Satar, alias Abu Zacaria, who in turn would have established himself as the new emir of the Islamic State in Southeast Asia (Yeo, 2022). Likewise, official reports speak of recent NPA attacks in the Bisayas, in the north of the island of Mindanao (Punongbayan & Desacada, 2022), in what is considered a repositioning of the group in the face of the emergency situation experienced during the pandemic inside the island.

Regardless of the approach adopted by the former dictator's son, what seems clear is that the solution must be to keep the peace accords stable, as well as to try to correct the mistakes of the past in order to continue advancing towards the goals of social justice and the fight against terrorism. International criticism of the new government, local distrust of the new administration, and recent events on the ground seem to point to an uncertain future for the southern Philippines, which could end up becoming the new focus of instability and insecurity in the Asia-Pacific area.

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Mujeres víctimas del terrorismo y mujeres contra el terrorismo. Historia, memoria, labor y legado.

Women victims of terrorism and women against terrorism. History, memory, work and legacy

Yolanda Alonso

AUTHOR: Coord. Laura González Piote, Alfredo Crespo Alcázar y José Luis Rodríguez Jiménez.
YEAR OF PUBLICATION: 2022
EDITORIAL: Dykynson

The terrorist phenomenon has become so complex that this work has brought together a plurality of authors from different academic disciplines (historians, jurists, political scientists, journalists) to tackle an object of study that is as controversial as it is multi-layered. In Spain we are no strangers to terrorism, after four decades of attacks by the terrorist group ETA and the emergence of jihadist terrorism on the international scene, and we believe that a work such as the one presented here is necessary.

This choral work presents a multidisciplinary field of study, an opportune work for the development of a deep and complete analysis of the complex terrorist phenomenon. Implicit in its content is a special focus: the analysis of the role played by women victims of terrorism and women activists against terrorism. Structured in ten chapters, they find a perfect connection and integration in their content given the plurality of studies structured around a central issue: terrorism. Its background lies almost entirely in valuing the victims of terrorism as moral references and fundamental actors to delegitimise violence with political intentions (p.15).

In this way, the first chapter by Professor Avilés is certainly enlightening, focusing precisely on the study of ETA terrorism from its beginnings around 1968 and up to 2010), although he also pays attention to other types of terrorism developed during the Transition period. He rightly urges us to analyse the concept of terrorism, as recurrent as it is necessary, both in its national and international aspects, placing special emphasis on its being a “means to achieve political objectives” (p.22). Clearly, the existence of the terrorist group is identified through “environmental factors that favoured its emergence in the Basque Country, the nationalist tradition born at the end of the 19th century, the memory of the civil war, the oppression of the dictatorship, etc.” (p.36), from its influence in the Transition to its “definitive cessation of armed activity in October 2011”

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(p.33).

In this sense, the evolution and types of measures adopted in the fight against terrorism analysed by Professor Pucci Rey in Chapter VIII stand out, since against the attempt by the terrorist phenomenon to spread terror and put an end to social order, anti-terrorist legislation infused an evolution in law in general, identifying here the legal right protected with the interest of the rule of law and national security itself (pp. 176-178).

Therefore, one of the most important legislative milestones in the fight against terrorism is dealt with legal rigour and mastery by Professor Fernández de Casadevante in Chapter VII. Organic Law 6/2002 of 27 June 2002 on political parties, the result of the Anti-Terrorist Pact born of the signing of the Agreement for Liberties and against Terrorism in December 2000 between the PP and the PSOE, was fundamental in expelling the nationalist left from public institutions by outlawing their respective political brands (Herri Batasuna, Euskal Herritarrok and Batasuna) (pp.157 et seq.) (pp.157 et seq.). All of this “was key in the struggle for a true delegitimisation of the gang’s activity” (p.164), although the haste in legalising its new political parties (Sortu and EH Bildu) has once again allowed “the rehabilitation of the pro-ETA milieu” (p.165) and its return to a presence in public institutions.

One of the determining factors when it comes to shaping the study of terrorism is the way in which the victims are valued, this being a social as well as a political requirement (p.16). However, we have seen how for decades, victims have been almost invisible in the eyes of society. In fact, there was a generalised absence of public response to terrorism.

In this sense, the figure of Ana María Vidal-Abarca, widow of Jesús Velasco (an army commander), murdered by ETA, stands out. Chapter V is devoted entirely to studying her figure and her activism against terrorism, marking a turning point in the emergence of associations for the defence of victims. The essence of this associative movement “aspired to bring together family members and demand their rights, especially those of the dozens of women who had been widowed by terrorism”, states Dr. María Jiménez Ramos (p.108).

This scant projection of the victims in society was particularly absent from the Spanish press during the Transition. At that time, the news focused almost exclusively on the terrorist groups and everything they generated, causing “more attention to be paid to the perpetrators than to the victims” (p.83). In Chapter IV, Professor Laura González bases her study on the analysis of the front pages of two media outlets with opposing ideologies, *El País* and *El Alcázar*. As a result, the news affecting women killed as a result of terrorism was reduced.


In the same way, invisibility is analysed from a perspective which is certainly representative and which reaches a supreme projection, the cinema, as through it, it is possible to analyse the historical context at a given moment, allowing us to understand the mentality of the time (p.144). To this end, Professor Josefina Martínez (Chapter VI) presents us with an overview of the predominant role of the victims which, once again, visualises the invisibility of the victims, so much so that “they focused on those who, through violence, sought to change the dominant political, social and cultural structures” (p.127). Given the international extension of the terrorist phenomenon, she not only focuses her analysis on Spanish cinema, but also looks at the different terrorist processes in Ireland, Germany, and Italy, in order to determine that the victims of the attacks, and even more so for women, had obtained a space in the films.

But there is no need to go that far back in time. Professor Alfredo Crespo Alcázar shows this invisibility in the public space dominated by the perpetrators through the aggression suffered by two members of the Guardia Civil and their partners in Alsasua on 15 October 2016. The use of violence as a legitimate tool for the persecution, exclusion, and expulsion of certain groups” considered to be “enemies of the people” (p.62) is a terrorist asset. He rightly concludes that “in certain sectors (political, social and media) there was a glorification of the perpetrators and a belittling of the victims in public and institutional statements” (p.75).

Victims in general are also analysed in Chapter X in order to understand and explain the events of history. Professor Rodríguez Jiménez praises the fundamental work of teachers in dealing with terrorism in the classroom teaching framework, as paying attention to victims is an interesting academic option and a social and political requirement (p.205).

However, there is also space to examine how women can be victimisers or at least aspire to be so. In this sense, the book analyses the radicalisation process of two female minors integrated into the jihadist terrorist organisation (Chapter II). The process of radicalisation is a process made up of different variables and different stages which, in this case, are analysed: on the one hand, from an individual dimension through the internal, rational, emotional, theological, etc. aspect. On the other hand, an intermediate level or factors related to the political and social environment close to the individual. Finally, the exogenous factors that are shown in the social, economic, political, and cultural environment. The authors, Professor Rogelio Alonso and Paul Delgado, conclude that “the victimisation of the Muslim population in different scenarios reinforced the legitimisation of violence through the radical ideology that approaches minors and where, within the process of radicalisation of minors, a radical Salafist jihadist ideology has a special influence” (p.56).

To conclude, we can affirm that we are faced with a perfectly systematised work that makes up a necessary work for the study and reflection on the tragedy of terrorism suffered by Spanish society. Events that must not be forgotten, as Ms. Concepción Martín López points out in Chapter IX, “we cannot allow forgetfulness and apathy to build walls of impunity, burying the obligation and the right to justice, just because Spanish society wants to look forward” (p.196).



Balas para todas. Seis mujeres periodistas en Oriente Medio y Magreb

Bullets for all. Six women journalists in the Middle East and the Maghreb

Teresa Sánchez

AUTHOR: Natalia Sancha

YEAR OF PUBLICATION: 2021

EDITORIAL: Larrad Ediciones

Balas para todas (*Bullets for all*) is the honest, intelligent, and often emotional account of the women who have narrated the conflicts in the convulsive Middle East and the Maghreb over the last decade. The work coordinated by Natalia Sancha is a reflection of the voices of six women correspondents in which current affairs blend with their lives, forming an almost indivisible whole.

This book, written amid the pandemic, unites and interweaves their stories with a clear objective, in the words of Natalia Sancha: “to honour all those women who have fallen victim to bullets in war, but also those who in their own way have risen up, fought or dared to tell what was happening there. Because in war, bullets know no gender. They are for everyone.” (p. 28).

The journalists, with different nationalities, languages, personal lives, and ways of doing the job, provide a global vision of what the profession of war correspondent is today: a very different concept, far removed from the longed-for “tribe” of which Leguineche spoke, a demystification of the memory that cinema and literature create, to approach something more real and complex. It is the lives of the protagonists where their work is, or the work of the protagonists where their lives are. Undoubtedly, the line between one and the other is too fine. But essentially, it is a work that speaks the truth, without any cover-up or dressing up. An opportunity to get to know the work of the war correspondent from the front line. With the victims, the forgotten, and the evicted.

Over the last ten years, the history of the Middle East and the Maghreb has been marked by the long shadow of jihadist terrorism. From the establishment of the caliphate in 2014 to its fall in 2019, the front pages of newspapers and major news networks have placed fourth-wave terrorism, according to David Rapoport’s classification, at the epicentre of the news. Similarly, this threat is a constant in this choral work, but with one

exception. The authors take a more human, real, and complex view of the effects of terrorism, forming a necessary contextualisation to understand its edges and the intricacies of the phenomenon.

The authors rightly put names to the stories: they bring them close to us and the wars and conflicts cease to be numbers and data and become men and women with personal experiences. Thus we find the story of Mohamed, who died in 2015 at the hands of Daesh: “Mohamed died fighting against ISIS in Sirte. Mohamed is not an abstract name, not even a subject expressing a metonymy. Mohamed was my little Libyan brother, the troublemaker in my local family” (p. 73).

If there is one thing a journalist hates, it is being the protagonist of the story. On 19 August 2014, a video with Daesh billing showed the beheading of American journalist James Foley. After two years of kidnapping, Foley topped the list as the first American to be executed by the terrorist group. Natalia Sancha recalls how she wrote that chronicle where the protagonist was a colleague: “he was not my friend, we barely met once in Beirut, but I was reluctant to write the obituary of a colleague. It was an atrocious death that left my body trembling. Selfishly, I thought it might be mine” (p. 93). According to Reporters Without Borders 28 journalists were abducted in 2021 by the self-styled Islamic State and 6 were killed in attacks claimed by Daesh or the Taliban. A few years ago, press accreditation saved their lives, now it puts them in the crosshairs.

But Daesh has not only executed journalists, but it has also used threats as a means of extortion and intimidation against correspondents. Sancha was targeted by the mujahideen of this terrorist group, who used social networks to launch hate messages against her. As she defines it, “what probably took her thirty seconds to type took me a whole week of sleep” (p. 93).

The book takes an extensive look at the work of female correspondents, especially during the Syrian war. Thus, the last stronghold of Daesh was also part of their work. In the spring of 2019, one of them was able to see the ravages of the siege to which the terrorist group was subjecting Syrians. Men were being interrogated by US-led coalition forces, while women and children awaited transfer to a camp for displaced people. One woman told her how she had left Iraq and joined Daesh but acknowledged, in her own words, that “life had slowly turned sour with ISIS” and now she wanted to live without bombs falling on her head (p. 161).

One of the main problems caused by the Syrian conflict has been the refugee issue, which affects women in particular. Underage girls are married off in marriages arranged by their parents. The increase in the number of such marriages is an example of the huge economic crisis in the country: the marriage of a daughter is one less burden on the family economy. The daughters, they say, are happy: “We are not like you Westerners. We like this life; men are not equal to women. He can do what he wants, we can’t” (p. 185).

On the other hand, the camps of Al-Hol, Roj, and Ain Issa have become a huge challenge for Western governments. The precarious situation, coupled with the havoc wreaked by the COVID-19 crisis, makes the situation more volatile by the minute. Khabat Abbas visited Al Roj camp (which hosts some 400 ISIS families, less radical than those in Al Hol camp) and Ains Issa camp, when she was acting as a fixer (a person who accompanies journalists on the ground) in 2017. In the Al Hol camp, children threw stones at her and women made threatening gestures because she was not wearing a veil or an abaya (p. 211). As a Kurd, her work brought her face to face with her brother’s murderers, those who destroyed her town and those who killed more

than eleven thousand fighters from the People's Protection Units (YPG) and the Women's Protection Units (YPJ) (p. 210).

The ravages of war and terrorism often extend their jaws to the weakest. In February 2019, the international media covered the fall of Daesh during the group's last stand in Baguz. Meanwhile, in a hospital in Hikma, we find one of the most moving and revealing stories in this book. The story of the babies of ISIS, children of ISIS fighters hospitalised for malnutrition, brings out the best and the worst of the human condition and is a song of hope in pain: "In my years covering the brutality of the war against ISIS I thought I had seen all the faces and facets of war, including the victims of ISIS, but this time these babies were the victims of a war and no one cared about them. The only ones who cared about them were those doctors, doing their job against politics" (p. 314).

In August 2014, the hordes of Daesh attacked Sinjar, starting a veritable genocide. Men who failed to escape were killed and younger women and children were abducted and subjected to the sex slave trade. An estimated 7,000 women and girls were victims of rape and other abuses including deprivation of their liberty. The book includes the chilling testimonies of survivors who lived in camps in Duhok or Khande: "I was held captive like any other Yazidi woman, but thank God, I escaped from the Islamic State and I am no longer bought and sold" (p. 320), said one of them.

This choral work is an excellent way to better understand the work of correspondents, in this case, told in the female form. Carmen de Burgos, the first female Spanish correspondent, said in an interview with José Montero in 1930: "I have done live, active, battle journalism. I have been the first woman to sit at the editorial desk, to report, to organise surveys, to live and feel. In short, combat journalism, agile, nervous, and bohemian", a phrase that any of the correspondents in this book could subscribe to.

In conclusion, journalism does not aim to change history, but to tell it: to make "the minute hand of history", according to the phrase attributed to Shopenhauer. The speed of information and the constant demand for updates clash with the slow journalism of the six correspondents in this book. A calm and necessary account of the realities that need to be told.

JAMA'AT NUSRAT AL-ISLAM WAL MUSLIMIN (JNIM)



ORGANIZATION TYPE:

Insurgent, non-state, religious, terrorist, transnational

IDEOLOGY:

Jihadi, Salafist, Sunni

FOUNDERS:

Iyad ag Ghaly, Yahia Abu al-Hamam, Hamadou Kuffa, al-Hassan al-Ansari, Abou Abderrahman al-Senhadjji

MAIN LEADERS:

Iyad ag Ghaly, Hamadou Kuffa (Katibat Macina)

PLACES OF ACTUATION:

Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger

YEARS OF ACTIVITY:

2017 to present

MEDIA:

Az-Zallaqa

ALLIANCES AND SYMPATHIZERS:

AQIM, al-Qaeda, Ansaru

Jamā'at Nuṣrat al-Islām wa-l-Muslimīn (جماعة نصرة الإسلام والمسلمين), also known by its acronym **JNIM**, meaning Group of Support for Islam and Muslims, is an *al-Qaeda* related terrorist organization, formed on March 2th of 2017 through the merger of different groups that operated in the Mali area and part of the Sahel: *al-Qaeda in the Sahel*, *Ansar Dine*, *al-Mourabitoun*, and *Katibat Macina*. Through the birth of **JNIM**, several groups that, in one way or another, already depended on it, are unified under the banner of **AQIM**. Since both Mali and the rest of the Sahel and neighboring countries are areas with a strong ethnic and tribal presence, the unification of groups of different ethnic groups in a single group facilitates the recruitment and adhesion of new members, as well as territorial and ideological aspirations. of the organization.

Since its foundation, **JNIM** has managed to establish itself as the reference group in the area, despite the attempts of rival factions, such as **ISGS**, as well as resist counter-terrorist operations directed against the phenomenon of jihadism in the Sahel, mainly through of Operation *Barkhane*.

Bringing together the existing void in Mali, **JNIM** has become the main threat to the stability of the area in a short period of time, currently having a presence in practically all the regions of Mali, and with more and more territorial governance capacities in front of to the weak legitimate government of the African country.

Beirut bombings, 23 October 1983

The year is 1983. We are at the midpoint of the Lebanese civil war, which began in 1975 and ended in 1990, causing an estimated 120,000 deaths. To be correct, it was not a single civil war, but a series of several, which succeeded or combined throughout the land of cedars in those fifteen years.

Lebanon was a country characterized by great multiculturalism, with Christians, Shiites, Sunnis, and Druze mainly located in different parts of the country. Thus, Christians and Druze were present in the north and west, while the Shia and the Sunni population were mainly located in the south and east of the country. This balance changed when, with the creation of the State of Israel, some 100,000 Palestinians arrived in Lebanon as refugees, causing the Muslim population to increase significantly from the previous status quo. This, coupled with the increasing presence of religion in the political landscape, led to tensions, as Christian Maronite elites dominated politics, while the majority of the population, Muslim at the time, frowned upon a government that they felt was too pro-Western. This tension escalated, creating two opposing camps over the future of the country. On the one hand, Muslims wanted Lebanon to be a country with an Arab identity, while Christians sought the opposite and an increasing rapprochement with the West.

The presence in Lebanon of Palestinian militias, who had a secure base from which to attack Israel, increased when the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), led by Yasser Arafat, arrived in Lebanon after being expelled from Jordan. Lebanese society became increasingly polarised, and the PLO took advantage of this to gain strength in the south of the country, where they had the support of the Muslim majority, joined by left-wing and pan-Arab movements, as well as the Druze.

Two distinct factions were formed: on the one hand, the Lebanese Front of Christian militias, backed by the conservative party, alongside the Israeli-backed Lebanese Forces; on the other hand, Muslims, leftist movements, and Druze allied themselves with the Lebanese National Movement.

Incidents of varying degrees of importance occurred from 1971 onwards, leading to intense fighting in the capital, Beirut. In 1975, Pierre Gemayel, leader of the conservative Social Democratic Party, better known as the Lebanese Phalanges, or *Kataeb* (from Phalange in Arabic) suffered an assassination attempt at a christening. In retaliation, members of the Phalanges decide to shoot up a bus in what is known as the 'bus massacre', killing twenty-seven Palestinians and injuring nineteen others on board. This massacre was to be the cause of the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war, which was to become a reflection of the bitter fighting that had been raging for years in the capital.

As the Lebanese civil war unfolded, there were various alliances and changes, as well as direct interventions by Syria and Israel, which used Lebanon in part as a proxy for settling their differences. The involvement of both states only worsened the situation. While Syria sought to prevent a northward expansion of the State of Israel, Israel sought to stamp out the PLO and the attacks it was leading from Lebanon.



Members of the Resistance of the Tigers, the armed wing of the National Liberal Party, a faction allied with the Christian Maronite Lebanese Phalanges. Circa 1978.

Syria, ruled by the Arab socialist dictator Hafez al-Asad, entered Lebanon, which initially led to a ceasefire. The weakened Lebanese government tried to take advantage of it to seek a peace agreement, but to no avail, and Israel decided to intervene. It launched a series of covert operations and attacks against Palestinian targets, trying to provoke them to commit terrorist acts to justify entry into the country. In this way, Israel would end up launching two operations (named “Litani” in 1978 and “Peace in Galilee” in 1982), despite the opposition of the United Nations, aimed at putting an end to the PLO and the Palestinian-Syrian alliance, achieving its objective by expelling Arafat and some eleven PLO militants from Beirut in 1982, when the Israeli army took over the city.

It was the Israeli incursions into Lebanese territory that led, at the request of the Lebanese government to the UN Security Council, to the creation by the United Nations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which began on 23 March 1978 with the arrival of 6,000 troops in the country. Although its effectiveness was rather limited in terms of fulfilling its tasks (confirming the withdrawal of the Israeli occupation forces, restoring peace and security, and helping the Lebanese government to guarantee its authority), various resolutions issued by the Security Council led Israel to withdraw from Beirut at the end of July 1982, although it would not withdraw completely from the south of the country until the year 2000.

It was also in August 1982 that the MNF, by which the Multinational Force in Lebanon would become known, was created, a peacekeeping operation led by the United States together with France, Italy, and the

United Kingdom, to facilitate the withdrawal of the PLO and other foreign actors from Lebanese territory, provide training and support to the Lebanese Armed Forces to restore the government's sovereignty.

The expulsion of the PLO from Beirut, and partially from Lebanon, led to the emergence of new factions within the various militias, supported by Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Libya, among others, depending on their interests. Two names born in 1982, the Islamic Jihad Organisation (IJO) and Hezbollah, were to play a major role in the events that unfolded on 23 October 1983.



Member of the Shi'a militia AMAL opening fire on the Druze in a clash in West Beirut in 1987.

In this context, the presence of foreign troops in the country was not welcomed by factions opposed to the legitimate government, and they soon began to be besieged by anti-Christian forces. The US detachment, composed of the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, of the 2nd Marine Division, was garrisoned in a four-storey building attached to Beirut's airport. The commanding colonel of the US Marine detachment that was part of the MNF, Timothy J. Geraghty, stated that the threat from Syria and Iran could be felt approaching as US efforts to assist the Lebanese government progressed. Marines were taking mortar and rifle fire from areas under Syrian control, while Geraghty himself had narrowly escaped a car bomb. In April 1983, there had already been an attack on the US embassy in Beirut, causing 60 casualties, which was claimed by the Islamic Jihad Organisation (hereafter IJO), stating that it was an attack on imperialist forces as part of the Iranian revolution.

At 6:22 a.m. on 23 October, a 19-ton Mercedes Benz truck loaded with a mixed explosive of butane gas and PETN (penthrite), designed to create an incendiary blast, drove through the security barrier into the Marine barracks building. The explosion, equivalent to about 9,200 kilos of TNT, brought down the four-storey building, which housed 300 soldiers, creating a 12-metre-deep crater where the truck was located. Such was the power of the explosion that ripped the building from its foundations, lifting it into the air and destroy-

ing it completely. It is considered to be the most powerful non-nuclear explosion since the Second World War at the time. The blast killed 241 people, of whom 220 were Marines and 20 civilian personnel. It became the deadliest attack on the Marine Corps since the Battle of Iwo Jima.



This building, which served as a barracks for the US Marines, was attacked on 23 October 1983.

Barely ten minutes after the attack on the US troops, another attack was made on the French MNF forces. Another bomb killed 55 French paratroopers who were stationed in the Drakkar building, just six kilometres from Beirut's international airport where the first explosion had taken place. In this case, many of the French soldiers were on their balconies watching the plume of smoke coming from the airport, and opened fire on the truck bomb, without managing to stop it. Although the explosion destroyed the nine-storey building the French were in, it appears that the amount of explosive in this second bomb was smaller and that in this case it was triggered by remote control. It was the largest French military loss since the Algerian war up to that point. In total, between the two attacks, 346 victims were counted, including the two attackers and other civilian casualties. In addition, there were 122 wounded among the Americans and another 15 among the French.

The attack on the Americans was carried out by an Iranian driver named Ismail Ascari and claimed by the IJO, which stated that it was a direct attack on the MNF presence in the country. At the time, no one was quite clear who the Islamic Jihad Organisation was, but the US authorities suspected that Syria and Iran were to some extent behind the attack.

US troops would withdraw from the MNF and Lebanon just months after the devastating attack in February 1984. An investigation was launched to find those responsible and to establish accountability, which would be published in 1985 as the “Inman Report”. It found that the Marines had failed to properly protect their barracks, facilitating the attack.





Diagram of the attack on the US barracks as it appeared in the Inman Report in 1985.

Over time, more information began to emerge about IJO. Although IJO and Hezbollah were initially thought to be separate organisations, research has determined that Islamic Jihad was a pseudonym used by Hezbollah to avoid being implicated, and was the name used by the Shi'a organisation to carry out attacks in Lebanon, parts of the Middle East, and Europe, just as it used the pseudonym Islamic Resistance for attacks it directed against Israel. Although founded in 1982, it was not until 1985 that Hezbollah became known as such. A 2003 US federal judicial investigation determined that those responsible for the attack were members of what would become known in 1985 as Hezbollah, but using the pseudonym Islamic Jihad, at the behest of the Iranian government. This investigation was backed up by an event in 2004, when the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) unveiled a memorial to the attack in Tehran's Behesht-e Zahra cemetery, in an area reserved for the 'martyrs of the Islamic world'. This, along with other information, made it possible to determine that Islamic Jihad was a kind of special operations battalion, run by both Hezbollah and the IRGC. The IJO was founded by Imad Fayeze Mughniyah in 1983 and was its leader until his demise in 1992. Mughniyah was also one of the leaders of Hezbollah and was involved in other attacks such as the hijacking of TWA flight 847 in 1985, as well as claiming responsibility for the 1988 Lockerbie attack for the IJO. Argentina declared him a participant in the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires. He became a prime target for US and Israeli counterterrorism, the latter deciding to take him out in 2008 when the Mossad planted a bomb in the headrest of the Mitsubishi he was driving in Damascus to attend the anniversary of the Iranian Revolution

organized in the Syrian capital by the Iranian ambassador. The Israeli explosive decapitated Mughniyah and destroyed the vehicle without causing further collateral damage.



Memorial stele installed by the IRGC at the Behesht-e Zahra cemetery in Tehran commemorating the attacks against the Americans and the French.

EPHEMERIS

1



MAY 2ND

Mali reports its unilateral decision to break all defense agreements signed with France, which continues with the gradual withdrawal of its troops, in addition to abandoning the G5 Sahel, a force created in 2017 together with Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso and Mauritania.

2



MAY 7TH

An ambush by Wilayat Sina, Daesh's regional franchise in the Sinai Peninsula, becomes the largest terrorist attack in Egypt in the last two years. At least 17 Egyptian soldiers are killed in an attack on a water pumping station east of the Suez Canal.

3



JUNE 5TH

A score of civilians is killed during an attack on a small village by Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). June would result in a hundred victims, by terrorist attacks, living in Christian villages in the northeastern region of DRC.

4



JUNE 7TH

In the framework of an international operation mainly deployed in Italy, the National Police arrests a man in Hospitalet del Llobregat (Barcelona), a follower of Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan. A link is established between the 14 arrested in Italy, the man arrested in Spain and the perpetrator of the September 2020 attack who attempted to re-attack Charlie Hebdo's headquarters in France.

5



JUNE 16TH

Through its weekly newsletter Al Naba, Daesh refers to Africa as a new land of Hijra (migration) and jihad, encouraging its fighters to migrate there and fight as in Syria and Iraq.

6



JULY 12ND

The United States eliminates the leader of Daesh in Syria in a drone strike. His defeat comes on the heels of a series of counterterrorism gains on the ground following the announcement of al-Ourashi's death just months earlier, in addition to the death of the leader and caliph of the self-proclaimed Islamic State Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2019.

7



JULY 31ST

The CIA conducts an operation that results in the death of Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. This political and strategic victory allows the United States to reduce the deployment of forces on the ground while continuing to lead the fight against terrorism in its areas of interest.

8



AUGUST 1ST

A supporter of the far-right Three Percenters movement is sentenced to more than seven years in prison for the assault on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. It is the longest sentence to date for anyone involved in the riot.

9



AUGUST 2ND

A joint offensive operation by Rwandan, Mozambican and Southern African Development Community security forces results in the release of 600 people taken hostage in Cabo Delgado by Daesh's new province (wilaya) in Mozambique (IS-Mozambique).

10



AUGUST 7TH

Israel and Islamic Jihad reach a cease-fire in Gaza at the end of three days of hostilities that claim the lives of at least 44 people. The cessation of violence follows the death of Khaled Mansour, commander of operations of the military branch of the terrorist movement in the south of the strip.

DID YOU KNOW THAT...?

In 2003, *al-Qaeda* planned to attack the New York City subway system using a device that would release toxic gas (specifically, hydrocyanic acid). This artifact, which has become part of the terrorist imagination due to its apparent simplicity and for which manuals can still be found in jihadist forums on the Internet, is known as *al-Mubtakkar al-Farid* (the unique invention). Ultimately, the attack was called off by *Ayman al-Zawahiri* just two months before it was carried out.



Ibrahim Hassan Tali al-Asiri, a.k.a. *Abu Saleh*, who was considered to be the person in charge of explosives of *al-Qaeda* in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), planned and executed one of the most "bizarre" terrorist attacks that can be mentioned. After being included by Saudi Arabia among their most wanted terrorist list in February 2009, he convinced his younger brother *Abdullah al-Asiri* (who was also included in the above mentioned most wanted list) to become a martyr, and kill the Saudi Prince *Muhammed bin Naif*, then assistant for security affairs at the Saudi Interior Ministry. To do this, *Ibrahim* hid an explosive device made with PETN in the rectum of his brother *Abdullah*, which the last detonated in the presence of the Prince, causing to him only minor injuries, dying *Abdullah* on the spot.

Although there is a widespread perception that those who are part of terrorist organizations are misfits and/or poorly educated individuals, the reality is that this is not always the case.

Many members of terrorist groups have higher education, such as: *Ayman al-Zawahiri*, surgeon; *Abdelmalek Droukdel*, mathematician; *Osama bin Laden*, business administration and management; *Anwar al-Awlaki*, civil engineer; *Yahya Ayyash*, electrical engineer; and so on.

So much so, that in a study carried out by Diego Gambetta and Steffen Hertog (*Engineers of Jihad: the curious connection between violent extremism and education*), they determined that the presence of engineers among known jihadists (on two samples of almost a thousand individuals in total) is fourteen times greater than that which would be explained by random distribution. Contrary to what one might think, this fact is not motivated by the need for technical knowledge for the manufacture of explosives that an engineer could take for granted, since most of them held or hold leadership positions in their organizations.



"Mr. Amin"

After being expelled from Sudan, and looking for a safe territory to expand his organization, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, *Ayman al-Zawahiri* decided to travel to Chechnya with a false Sudanese passport, in which he appeared under the identity of *Abdullah Imam Mohammed Amin*. He was detained at the Dagestan border, and placed under arrest by the Russian FSB in the capital, a situation in which he remained for five months. He was released after being given a light sentence of six months (of which he had already been imprisoned for five), since the Russian security services did not translate from Arabic the vast information that he stored on his laptop. "*God blinded them to our identities*", *al-Zawahiri* wrote later about this event.

In collaboration with:



17-A. The attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils

Inés Gaviria

On 17 August 2017, a new jihadist attack was committed in Spain, thirteen years after the brutal attacks of 11M. On that fateful 17 August 2017, at around 5 p.m., a van driven by the terrorist Younes Abouyaaqoub drove along Las Ramblas in Barcelona and committed a mass attack in the central area of the promenade, from Buen Suceso street to the Miró pavement. The attack killed fourteen people - including two children aged three and seven respectively - and injured 131. Hours after the attack, Las Ramblas terrorist tried to escape by stealing Pablo Pérez Villán's car and killing him to make his getaway. Pablo was the fifteenth victim to die. During his escape, the terrorist jumped several police checkpoints, running over several officers who were injured. But the terror did not end there. Hours later, at 1.15 a.m. on 18 August, another terrorist attack took place in the coastal town of Cambrils, in the province of Tarragona. Another car with five members of the same jihadist cell massively ran over pedestrians. Six people were injured and one died.

Catalonia has been a region particularly hard hit by terrorism of all stripes and ideologies over the last few decades. The first victim of terrorism in this autonomous community was the civil guard Dionisio Medina Serrano, murdered by the FAC (Front d'Alliberament Català) on 7 March 1971. Dionisio was on his way home at the end of the working day when, as he passed by the Barcelona Provincial Council Collection Agency, a powerful explosion killed him instantly. He was married and had a daughter. Another 113 people have died in Catalonia since the murder of Dionisio Medina, due to the criminal activity of nine terrorist groups of different origin and inspiration: Daesh, ETA, Terra Lliure, GRAPO or FRAP are some of them. Attacks such as that of Hipercor (1987), that of the Guardia Civil barracks in Vic (1991) or those we recall in this issue of RIET are among the cruelest and most deadly that have been perpetrated in Spain.

However, despite being one of the regions most affected by terrorism in Spain, the victims in Catalonia complain of having felt social and institutional abandonment. Also those of the attacks of 17 and 18 August 2017. The convulsive political climate that has existed in Catalonia for years has become a shadow that accompanies many of the institutional acts in memory of the victims of terrorism. Terrorism knows how to take advantage of any hint of democratic weakness: a disunited society is a fertile ground for spreading its threat

further and further. In the battle against terrorism - which is not only police and judicial, but also political - it is essential to protect and support the victims. Remembering their names and stories is not only an ethical duty, but also a way to prevent violent radicalisation. Victims are a fundamental structural part of the fight against terrorism because they counter the hate speech spread by murderers. Given that victims in Catalonia suffer from institutional neglect, it is no coincidence that Catalonia is one of the most vulnerable regions to jihadist radicalisation in Spain.

In a context in which the global jihadist movement is far from being defeated, support for the victims of terrorism must be a priority, above any political rivalry and antagonism. Such explicit support sends a very powerful message to terrorists: that they will achieve nothing because society stands with the victims. In a country that has suffered so much from terrorism of all kinds as Spain has, this is a very important lesson that we have yet to learn.

BRUNO GULOTTA

Born in: Italy

Age: 35

Children: 1

Marital Status: Married

Occupation: Computer Scientist

Date of the attack: 17/08/2017

Place of attack: Barcelona

Perpetrators: Ripoll Cell

Weapon: Van

Killed by: Jihadist terrorism

Description of the attack:

On 17 August 2017, at around 17.00, a van driven by terrorist Younes Abouyaaqoub drove along Barcelona's Las Ramblas promenade and committed a mass hit-and-run in the central area of the promenade, from Buen Suceso street to the Miró pavement. The attack killed fifteen people, including two children aged three and seven, and injured 131.

At the time of the attack, Bruno Gulotta was walking along Las Ramblas with his wife and two children, one aged six and the other seven months. Their walk was cut short when a lorry tried to run over everyone in its path. In an act of heroism, Bruno pulled his son out of the way of the lorry and got in front of it to save him. He succeeded, but at the cost of his own life.



CARMEN LOPARDO

Born in: Italy
Age: 80
Children: 1
Occupation: Retired
Date of the attack: 17/08/2017
Place of attack: Barcelona
Perpetrators: Ripoll Cell
Weapon: Van
Killed by: Jihadist terrorism



Description of the attack:

On 17 August 2017, at around 17.00, a van driven by terrorist Younes Abouyaaqoub drove along Barcelona's Las Ramblas promenade and committed a mass hit-and-run in the central area of the promenade, from Buen Suceso street to the Miró pavement. The attack killed fifteen people, including two children aged three and seven, and injured 131.

Carmen Lopardo was one of the victims of the attack. She had travelled to Europe on a tour organised to spend the winter months in Argentina in warmer places. Carmen was born in a small Italian village, Sasso di Castalda, in the province of Potenza, in the south of the country, which now has 800 inhabitants. She was only thirteen years old when she embarked on 5 April 1950 for Buenos Aires, like so many other Italians fleeing the poverty and misery that plagued the country after World War II. She never lost her Italian nationality, but she considered herself above all Argentinian. She lived in this Latin American country until the summer of 2017 when she decided to join a tourist trip that included Barcelona among its destinations.

DESIRÉ EUGENIA ZOLOTAS

Born in: Germany

Age: 51

Children: 2

Marital Status: Married


Date of the attack: 17/08/2017

Place of attack: Barcelona

Perpetrators: Ripoll Cell

Weapon: Van

Killed by: Jihadist terrorism



Description of the attack:

On 17 August 2017, at around 17.00, a van driven by terrorist Younes Abouyaaqoub drove along Barcelona's Las Ramblas promenade and committed a mass hit-and-run in the central area of the promenade, from Buen Suceso street to the Miró pavement. The attack killed fifteen people, including two children aged three and seven, and injured 131.

Desirée Eugenia Zolotas was seriously injured. She was admitted to the Hospital del Mar in Barcelona for ten days, where she finally died. Desireé Eugenia Zolotas, her husband, and two children were walking along Las Ramblas in Barcelona on the evening of 17 August 2017 when the terrorist attack occurred. Désireé was admitted to Hospital del Mar in critical condition. Her children were treated for minor injuries and returned to Greece, where the family lives, to their paternal grandparents before Desiree Eugenia Zolotas died of brain death on 27 August.

ELKE LEONA FLORENTINA VANBOCKRIJCK

Born in: Belgium

Age: 44

Children: 2

Marital Status: Married

Occupation: Belgian postal service employee

Date of the attack: 17/08/2017

Place of attack: Barcelona

Perpetrators: Ripoll Cell

Weapon: Van

Killed by: Jihadist terrorism

Description of the attack:

On 17 August 2017, at around 17.00, a van driven by terrorist Younes Abouyaaqoub drove along Barcelona's Las Ramblas promenade and committed a mass hit-and-run in the central area of the promenade, from Buen Suceso street to the Miró pavement. The attack killed fifteen people, including two children aged three and seven, and injured 131.

Elke Leona Florentina Vanbockrijck was going to spend a week in Barcelona with her husband and two children, as one of them, a Barcelona fan, dreamed of visiting the Camp Nou Stadium. In addition, the boy, whose name was Vic, was very excited to discover that there was a town in Catalonia with the same name. The couple had been married for three years and Elke's relatives described her in El País as "a charming woman, always ready to accompany her children to play football, her great hobby".



FRANCISCO LÓPEZ RODRÍGUEZ

Born in: Andalusia

Age: 57

Children: 3

Marital Status: Married

Occupation: Milling lathe operator

Date of the attack: 17/08/2017

Place of attack: Barcelona

Perpetrators: Ripoll Cell

Weapon: Van

Killed by: Jihadist terrorism

Description of the attack:

On 17 August 2017, at around 17.00, a van driven by terrorist Younes Abouyaaqoub drove along Barcelona's Las Ramblas promenade and committed a mass hit-and-run in the central area of the promenade, from Buen Suceso street to the Miró pavement. The attack killed fifteen people, including two children aged three and seven, and injured 131.

Francisco López Rodríguez was the first victim identified out of fifteen killed in the 17 August 2017 jihadist attack in Barcelona. Francisco was walking with his wife, her niece, and their two children when he fell victim to the massacre. In addition to Francisco, his grandnephew Xavier Martínez Mompart, aged three, was also killed. He fell out of the pushchair as a result of the impact of the truck, hit his head, and died a few hours after in the hospital.



XAVIER MARTÍNEZ MOMPART

Born in: Catalonia

Age: 3

Date of the attack: 17/08/2017

Place of attack: Barcelona

Perpetrators: Ripoll Cell

Weapon: Van

Killed by: Jihadist terrorism



Description of the attack:

On 17 August 2017, at around 17.00, a van driven by terrorist Younes Abouyaaqoub drove along Barcelona's Las Ramblas promenade and committed a mass hit-and-run in the central area of the promenade, from Buen Suceso street to the Miró pavement. The attack killed fifteen people, including two children aged three and seven, and injured 131.

Xavier Martínez Mompert was barely three years old when the terrorist barbarity ended his life. He was walking with his great-uncle Francisco López Rodríguez – who was also killed in the attack – his great-aunt, his mother, and his sister along Las Ramblas when he was hit by the van, fell from the trolley, hit his head, and died.

IAN MOORE WILSON

Born in: Canada

Children: 1

Marital Status: Married


Date of the attack: 17/08/2017

Place of attack: Barcelona

Perpetrators: Ripoll Cell

Weapon: Van

Killed by: Jihadist terrorism



Description of the attack:

On 17 August 2017, at around 17.00, a van driven by terrorist Younes Abouyaaqoub drove along Barcelona's Las Ramblas promenade and committed a mass hit-and-run in the central area of the promenade, from Buen Suceso street to the Miró pavement. The attack killed fifteen people, including two children aged three and seven, and injured 131.

Ian Moore Wilson was on Las Ramblas with his wife, Valerie, when the van hit him. His family described Ian to the media as "a compassionate and generous person, who likes to explore new places, who is always open to debate and who gives in to a good beer". Ian and Valerie's daughter Fiona arrived as soon as she could from Canada. She knew that her parents, her son, and her ex-husband were in Barcelona, staying on the Rambla. When she arrived in Barcelona she was told that her father, Ian Moore Wilson, had been killed in the attack as he was walking along the Rambla with his wife on his way to the flat where they were to meet Robert and his grandson, Duncan Bates, who had preferred to spend the day at the beach.

JARED ALTON TUCKER

Born in: EEUU

Age: 43

Children: 3

Marital Status: Married

Date of the attack: 17/08/2017

Place of attack: Barcelona

Perpetrators: Ripoll Cell

Weapon: Van

Killed by: Jihadist terrorism



Description of the attack:

On 17 August 2017, at around 17.00, a van driven by terrorist Younes Abouyaaqoub drove along Barcelona's Las Ramblas promenade and committed a mass hit-and-run in the central area of the promenade, from Buen Suceso street to the Miró pavement. The attack killed fifteen people, including two children aged three and seven, and injured 131.

Jared Alton Tucker was travelling in Europe with his wife to celebrate their wedding anniversary when he was hit by the terrorist who perpetrated the mass shooting with the van. Before travelling to Barcelona, they had been to Paris and Venice. Speaking to the media, his wife described Tucker as "the man with the most magnetic personality anyone has ever met". "He's funny and everybody wants to be around him. People love him... He would give his all for any of his friends". Jared Alton Tucker's family launched a crowdfunding campaign to help pay for his funeral. They raised more than \$25,000.

JOSEFINA CODINA OLIVERAS

Born in: Catalonia

Age: 75

Children: 1

Marital Status: Married

Occupation: Retired

Date of the attack: 17/08/2017

Place of attack: Barcelona

Perpetrators: Ripoll Cell

Weapon: Van

Killed by: Jihadist terrorism

Description of the attack:

On 17 August 2017, at around 17.00, a van driven by terrorist Younes Abouyaaqoub drove along Barcelona's Las Ramblas promenade and committed a mass hit-and-run in the central area of the promenade, from Buen Suceso street to the Miró pavement. The attack killed fifteen people, including two children aged three and seven, and injured 131.

Josefina Codina was walking along Las Ramblas with her daughter, who managed to save her life. She loved walking, even though she had been suffering from a leg ailment for some time. "She was very friendly with everyone. She was a very good woman, and people loved her very much here", Enriqueta Ordeig, a resident of Sant Hipòlit de Voltregà, a small town near Vic where Josefina lived, told El País.



JULIEN ALESSANDRO CADMAN

Born in: Australia

Age: 7

Occupation: Student

Date of the attack: 17/08/2017

Place of attack: Barcelona

Perpetrators: Ripoll Cell

Weapon: Van

Killed by: Jihadist terrorism



Description of the attack:

On 17 August 2017, at around 17.00, a van driven by terrorist Younes Abouyaaqoub drove along Barcelona's Las Ramblas promenade and committed a mass hit-and-run in the central area of the promenade, from Buen Suceso street to the Miró pavement. The attack killed fifteen people, including two children aged three and seven, and injured 131.

Julien Cadman, a seven-year-old boy, died on Las Ramblas, where he was walking with his mother. The boy had been missing for several days until it was confirmed that he was one of the fatal victims of the attack. The boy's family sent messages of help on social networks to find him and even the Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, expressed his concern for the situation the family was going through. His mother was injured in the attack and remained in a serious but stable condition in a Barcelona hospital for several weeks.

LUCA RUSSO

Born in: Italy

Age: 25

Children: 0

Marital Status: Single

Occupation: Computer engineer

Date of the attack: 17/08/2017

Place of attack: Barcelona

Perpetrators: Ripoll Cell

Weapon: Van

Killed by: Jihadist terrorism

Description of the attack:

On 17 August 2017, at around 17.00, a van driven by terrorist Younes Abouyaaqoub drove along Barcelona's Las Ramblas promenade and committed a mass hit-and-run in the central area of the promenade, from Buen Suceso street to the Miró pavement. The attack killed fifteen people, including two children aged three and seven, and injured 131.

Luca Russo was on holiday with his girlfriend in Barcelona. He had graduated from university at the end of 2016 and a few weeks before the trip had found a job. He celebrated these achievements on Facebook with this message: "Now I'm ready to start a new work experience – stay hungry, stay crazy!". He also thanked "all the people who have accompanied and sustained me over the years". "We were walking together when the van came over us," Luca's girlfriend told her aunt, interviewed by the Ansa news agency. "Marta fell to the ground and Luca disappeared, from that moment she never saw him again, his body was swept away," said Marta's aunt.



MARIA CORREIA

Born in: Portugal

Age: 20

Children: 0

Marital Status: Single

Occupation: Student

Date of the attack: 17/08/2017

Place of attack: Barcelona

Perpetrators: Ripoll Cell

Weapon: Van

Killed by: Jihadist terrorism

Description of the attack:

On 17 August 2017, at around 17.00, a van driven by terrorist Younes Abouyaaqoub drove along Barcelona's Las Ramblas promenade and committed a mass hit-and-run in the central area of the promenade, from Buen Suceso street to the Miró pavement. The attack killed fifteen people, including two children aged three and seven, and injured 131.

Maria Correia and her grandmother Maria Lurdes Ribeiro were very close. So much so that her grandmother wanted to celebrate her 74th birthday with her in Barcelona. "They arrived, settled in, got in touch with the family, and decided to go for a little walk," explained Portuguese Secretary of State José Luís Carneiro. Both died during the attack.



MARÍA LURDES RIBEIRO

Born in: Portugal

Age: 74

Children: 1

Occupation: Retired


Date of the attack: 17/08/2017

Place of attack: Barcelona

Perpetrators: Ripoll Cell

Weapon: Van

Killed by: Jihadist terrorism



Description of the attack:

On 17 August 2017, at around 17.00, a van driven by terrorist Younes Abouyaaqoub drove along Barcelona's Las Ramblas promenade and committed a mass hit-and-run in the central area of the promenade, from Buen Suceso street to the Miró pavement. The attack killed fifteen people, including two children aged three and seven, and injured 131.

Maria Lurdes Ribeiro wanted to celebrate her 74th birthday with her granddaughter Maria Ribeiro, with whom she was very close, in Barcelona. "They arrived, settled in, contacted the family, and decided to go for a little walk," explained Portuguese Secretary of State José Luís Carneiro, after learning the identities of the two Portuguese victims in the attack.

SILVINA ALEJANDRA PEREYRA CABRERA

Born in: Argentina

Age: 40

Children: 0

Marital Status: Single

Occupation: Shop assistant at the fruit shop Vidal Pons 1897

Date of the attack: 17/08/2017

Place of attack: Barcelona

Perpetrators: Ripoll Cell

Weapon: Van

Killed by: Jihadist terrorism

Description of the attack:

On 17 August 2017, at around 17.00, a van driven by terrorist Younes Abouyaaqoub drove along Barcelona's Las Ramblas promenade and committed a mass hit-and-run in the central area of the promenade, from Buen Suceso street to the Miró pavement. The attack killed fifteen people, including two children aged three and seven, and injured 131.

Silvina Alejandra Pereyra Cabrera, an Argentinian of Bolivian descent, had been living in the Catalan capital for more than ten years. She had been working for five years as a shop assistant in the fruit shop Vidal Pons 1897. She was an excellent person, cheerful, she made a great effort. What can I say about her? Yesterday we thought she was missing and today we know she is no more. Her closest colleagues are devastated," a colleague told El País the day after the attack.



PABLO PÉREZ VILLÁN



Born in: Catalonia

Age: 34

Children: 0

Marital Status: Single

Occupation: Worker in the wine sector and NGO aid worker

Date of the attack: 17/08/2017

Place of attack: Sant Just Desvern

Perpetrators: Ripoll Cell

Weapon: Bladed weapon

Killed by: Jihadist terrorism

Description of the attack:

On 17 August 2017, at around 17.00, a van driven by terrorist Younes Abouyaaqoub drove along Barcelona's Las Ramblas promenade and committed a mass shooting in the central area of the promenade, from Buen Suceso street to the Miró pavement. The attack killed fifteen people, including two children aged three and seven, and injured 131.

Pablo Pérez lived in Vilafranca del Penedès, worked in Barcelona in a company in the wine sector, worked as an aid worker for several NGOs, and was passionate about football. On 17 August, Pablo was returning to Vilafranca in his Ford Focus when a Daesh terrorist assaulted him, stabbed him, and took his car. With his car, the Daesh terrorists linked to the Barcelona attack tried to bypass police checkpoints by running over several police officers.

Those close to Pablo describe him as a person "very active, supportive and integrated into the associative life of Vilafranca, especially in everything related to sport". As an international aid worker, he went to help many countries, including Haiti. His aunt, Kety Villán Núñez, says that at first, the Mossos d'Ésquadra thought Pablo was one of the terrorists, and so they told the family. "We couldn't believe it... The suffering was... Terrible. The loss, the doubts, the uncertainty. We came to doubt him, but it couldn't be... A person like him, a person of solidarity, dedicated to others, could not be a terrorist. We couldn't believe it.

At the time of the attack, Pablo's family was in Benicàssim and travelled to Barcelona in the early hours of the morning. Several hours later, the authorities confirmed that Pablo Pérez had been the victim of the attack. "We are relieved, but at the same time, we feel guilty for having doubted him. It's unforgivable that they made us doubt him like that," confesses Kety.

ANA MARÍA SUÁREZ LÓPEZ

Born in: Aragon

Age: 67

Children: 0

Marital Status: Married

Occupation: Retired

Date of the attack: 18/08/2017

Place of attack: Cambrils

Perpetrators: Ripoll Cell


Weapon: Bladed weapon

Killed by: Jihadist terrorism

Description of the attack:

On 17 August 2017, at around 17.00, a van driven by terrorist Younes Abouyaaqoub drove along Barcelona's Las Ramblas promenade and committed a mass hit-and-run in the central area of the promenade, from Buen Suceso street to the Miró pavement. The attack killed fifteen people, including two children aged three and seven, and injured 131.

Hours after the Barcelona attack, at 1.15 am on 18 August, another terrorist attack took place in the coastal town of Cambrils, in the province of Tarragona. Another car with five members of the same jihadist cell massively ran over pedestrians on a pedestrian promenade. Six people were injured and Ana María Suárez was the only one killed. In the early hours of 18 August 2017, she was in Cambrils celebrating the birthday of her husband, Roque Oriol, which had been 16 August. Also with them was Ana's sister, Alicia Suárez. Both Ana María's husband and her sister were seriously injured and were admitted to the ICU at hospitals in the province of Tarragona, but managed to save their lives.



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Two files must be sent in Word format. One including the author's name, professional affiliation and a brief description of the author's CV at the footer, and the other with an anonymous version of the paper.

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 - Second level sections must be numbered and in italics (1.1).
 - Third level sections must be numbered and underlined (1.1.).
 - Conclusions
 - Bibliographic references arranged alphabetically.
- The text must follow Arial 12 style with 1.5 line spacing. Double space will not be used except in the heading of each main section. Tabs will be avoided, with exceptions. The paper must present a justified alignment.
- Citations longer than four lines must be tabulated and spaced from the upper and lower paragraphs.
- The citation model will be based on APA format, adding in the text in parentheses the surname(s) of the authors along with the year of publication of the work and the page, if necessary (González, 2015:35). It will be fully cited in the final section of bibliographic references. Footnotes will be reserved for clarifications, comments or punctuations, and used with moderation.
- Numerically ordered tables or graphs may be included. All of them must have a short description beginning with FIGURE X. (FIGURE 4. EVOLUTION TABLE OF ATTACKS). It will be necessary to indicate the origin of the source at the end of the description, whether it is from another author or self-elaborated (SOURCE: own elaboration).

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